An Uncomfortable Lesson From the Ukraine-Russia War: Challenging the United Nations’ Policy on Nuclear Proliferation

In 1994, Ukraine surrendered its nuclear deterrent in exchange for ultimately redundant security guarantees. The ongoing humanitarian crisis in Ukraine demands that the philosophical underpinnings of such decisions be unapologetically scrutinized. But in some sense, whether nuclear weapons are a guarantor of geopolitical stability or amongst the chief threats to human civilization is beside the point. A fundamental hypocrisy exists at the core of the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) policy towards nuclear proliferation. 

Controversial, realist academic John Mearsheimer (1993) warned against denuclearizing Ukraine, arguing in an academic paper that allowing Russia to become the only nuclear power in eastern Europe would inevitably fuel ambitions of conquest. This view is rooted in the cynical notion that interstate conflict is an inevitable consequence of human nature, and that a dynamic of mutually assured destruction is the most efficacious means of containing it. This is supported by quantitative literature, which showcases that nuclear weapons greatly reduce the risk of war when they are distributed symmetrically; but, as Ukraine demonstrates, may actually increase it when distributed asymmetrically. 

While correlation cannot prove causation, there remains no precedent of two nuclear powers engaging in a direct, all-out military confrontation. Indeed, the post-WW2 era remains the most peaceful in history in terms of interstate conflict. The anecdotes one can leverage to support deterrence theory are endless, from the West's U-turn in the invasion of Libya once it had eliminated its weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), to the United State’s ongoing stalemate with North Korea. It’s unfalsifiable speculation as to whether nuclear deterrence can prevail in perpetuity, but given the countless continental-scale wars of our pre-nuclear history, it would be unwise to wager that a world of “only” advanced conventional weapons would be preferable. 

Of course, it only takes one irrational actor, one un-deterred hegemon, to inflict unfathomable suffering on millions of people. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not only cause approximately 250,000 casualties, but the effects of radiation precipitated biological defects in generations to come. The nuclear weapons of today are exponentially more dangerous, with a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) - Russia war scenario which could potentially lead to 770 million direct deaths, in addition to global famine, food shortages and the collapse of the ozone layer. It is entirely reasonable then, that policymakers of a more liberal persuasion wish to eliminate these prospective horrors from the future of humanity. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a reminder that closing the door to one evil may merely open the door to another. 

This begs the question as to whether the United States and its NATO allies are in part responsible for placing misguided faith in the capacity for globalization to foster organic peace. There will always be a compelling argument for, and most certainly against, the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Yet, there is a broader hypocrisy that Ukraine’s denuclearization exposes. The West burdens the weak with its ideals. The citizens of the United Kingdom & United States sleep safely knowing that no matter how unhinged Putin may become, they have the most powerful tools on earth at their disposal. However, it was the same members of the UNSC that insisted Ukraine, a geographically vulnerable nation, walk the noble path of disarmament. 

It’s experimental idealism for them, and ruthless pragmatism for us. This is what is morally untenable about the current approach to proliferation by existing nuclear powers. They are so concerned with the prospect of nuclear warfare that they insist others must sacrifice their right to deterrence in the name of a greater ideal, while simultaneously, all P5 members continue to expand and modernize their arsenals. If any given nation refuses to commit to substantial disarmament, that is an inherent admittance that they perceive their nuclear arsenal as an effective deterrent. In which case, it is not logically coherent for them to deny that same capability to another state. Irrespective of whether one believes proliferation should be prevented, surely all sides of the debate can concede there must be coherence in what a state demands of others, and what it does itself. 

Given the countless families that have been slaughtered in Ukraine, the west’s great powers must accept that neither their word nor their sanctions are enough to safeguard those in the headlights of their adversaries. There is a colonial undertone to the notion that the world is a more dangerous place when a non-western nation has a nuclear weapon, but a safer one when the U.S. plans to build a new $100 billion nuclear missile. The United Nations anti-proliferation efforts would be better spent on existing nuclear powers, particularly those that continue to expand without shame, namely the US, Russia, and China. Even so, it’s been over half a century since the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was formulated and proliferation of all forms has only accelerated. Until an enforceable framework for global disarmament can be evidently justified, it may be more pragmatic for the UN to focus on preventing nuclear asymmetries above all else. 

Expanding the nuclear umbrella of NATO may be one means by which deterrence can be propagated without further proliferating weapons of mass destruction. That being said, is it truly conceivable that the United States would risk military escalation to protect nations many of its citizens could not pin on a map? Indeed, NATO may be founded on one profound bluff. The situation in Taiwan looks equally grim. While the Biden administration is rightly stepping up its rhetoric, the United States’s “strategic ambiguity” on the matter remains unconvincing. Put simply, it is clear no great power, not least the United States, wants to be locked into a third world war that could end in a nuclear holocaust. If traditional military engagement is no longer a viable means by which vulnerable nations can be protected, a world of widespread nuclear deterrence may be preferable to one in which there are no consequences for states which invade other nations. 

This is an uncomfortable point to argue. But the technology to destroy the world sadly already exists. The question is, should it be distributed equally, in a manner that may uphold their only conceivable benefit. Or, should the nuclear powers of this world continue this facade that disarmament is their genuine conviction, while they enhance their arsenals behind the curtains? Until disarmament becomes a genuine pursuit of the UNSC, why should the non-proliferation treaty continue to be enforced horizontally? So-called “rogue” actors look set to achieve their ambitions in any case. 

The true lesson here is that, notwithstanding how much one may despise nuclear weapons, there isn’t a geopolitical actor with the authority at this time to eliminate them. Experimenting with disarmament in  Ukraine was hypocrisy with existential consequences. The members of the UNSC should either commit to a nuclear-weapon-free world, or commit to forming a stable balance of power in which such weaponry is accessible to all who feel they face imminent danger; but the era of nuclear hegemony must surely end.