Europe’s Next Steps in Transatlantic Security

Following Vladimir Putin’s second invasion of Ukraine, the West has come together in ways not thought possible a mere two years ago. Given the Trump administration’s poor relationship with America’s European allies, frequent criticism of NATO, and French President Emmanuel Macron’s assertion that NATO was experiencing “brain-death,” the transatlantic relationship has completed a U-turn. The United States and Europe seem to be in ideological lockstep regarding the Russia-Ukraine War, even if security priorities differ across the continent during times of peace. This cohesion across the Atlantic brings welcome stability to NATO, whose future was uncertain during the Trump administration. Yet, it also raises questions about the future of the transatlantic relationship and what kind of role each party will play in an evolving security climate. 

The war in Ukraine and the West’s subsequent reaction has made it clear that European security is still heavily dependent on American support. There are those in Europe, such as Macron, who have expressed the desire to move Europe further towards strategic autonomy and away from reliance on the U.S. Those ambitions, however, have likely come to a standstill following the outbreak of war in Eastern Europe. As evidenced by their level of support for Ukraine, Germany’s Scholz’ and France’s Macron, the probable leaders of such a European-led alliance, have not inspired the kind of confidence necessary to lead a collective security alliance without significant American support. Rather, the American military presence in Europe is slated to enlarge, with additional deployments of troops, weapons systems, and aircraft set to be delivered to both Eastern and Western Europe, including a permanent U.S. base in Poland. Even historically neutral Sweden and Finland are on the cusp of NATO membership following Turkey’s agreement at the G7 Summit, further signifying the increased relevance and importance of the alliance for European states. As the United States has the largest military by a wide margin and provides the most financial support to NATO in terms of aggregate expenditures, a significant NATO presence is effectively a significant American presence. 

Certainly, strong ties between the United States and Europe are to be celebrated and the reparation of the relationship was one of the first foreign policy initiatives necessary for the Biden administration to address. Even so, too much of a one-sided relationship may not be beneficial for the further strategic development of either party. As the United States reaffirms its commitments to a strong, secure Europe, Europe’s more capable states should take similar steps. Although a robust European-led collective security system does not seem to be in the cards in the near future, NATO provides the existing infrastructure and avenue for Europe to strive towards self-sufficient collective security while remaining under the security umbrella of the United States. While the U.S. is the de facto leader of the alliance, increased leadership and responsibility from the likes of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom would be welcome. There is current opportunity, incentive, and widespread public support for the transatlantic relationship to strengthen further with increased commitment and initiative from European partners. 

In a June 2022 survey of 11 NATO states and Sweden, the Pew Research Center found increased support for NATO in several places since the outbreak of war in Ukraine. In Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, nearly 70 percent of respondents support NATO, while favorability reaches 89 percent in Poland. Russia’s invasion of a sovereign nation in Europe has increased public support of giving priority to transatlantic defense, giving European governments a green light to invest in their own security. Indeed, since the outbreak of war, several European states have pledged to substantially increase defense spending, which German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has coined as a Zeitenwende, or, turning point, for Germany’s relationship with their own security. If these pledges are to become tangible action, NATO and the transatlantic security relationship will evolve more in the form of a true partnership and less in the form of a dependent relationship. With Washington’s attention and commitments spread further than just Europe, it would behoove Europe’s states to seize the opportunity to increase their own role within and beyond NATO.

At this moment in time in particular, it would be short-sighted for European states to not follow through with their announced intentions to become more autonomous, or rather, capable, in terms of their own security. While the United States under President Biden will remain committed to transatlantic defense, that support and stability should not be taken for granted. In American domestic politics, there is an increasing rise of isolationism present within the far-right. Reporting during the Trump presidency indicated that President Trump considered withdrawing the United States from NATO, and a future administration could very well act in this manner. The atmosphere in the West following June’s G7 Summit in Bavaria, as described in the Leaders’ Communiqué, is one of unity and resolve. It would be beneficial for the relationship if that energy is now used for progress and evolution, rather than a return to the status quo.

The possibility of the return of an isolationist to the White House, however, is not the sole reason for urgent parity in NATO. Washington’s increased focus on Asia since the Asia Pivot is not likely to go away given China’s continued global rise, even if the war in Ukraine has rightfully taken center stage lately. Furthermore, if not given significant priority quickly, the Biden administration could have another crisis on hand in Iran. As Tehran moves ever closer to nuclear weapon capabilities, the Biden administration will increase focus there in hopes of salvaging the Iran Nuclear Deal, whether that shift is proactive or reactionary. These significant foreign policy challenges on the horizon for the Biden administration may lead to decreased emphasis on Europe and transatlantic security, particularly if the war in Ukraine soon reaches a conclusion. Europe should therefore prepare for the possibility of the United States’ foreign interests to shift, or at least be shared, elsewhere.

Such a robust shift in defense strategy for Europe cannot be expected to occur overnight, however, even if true intention is actually present on the part of Europe’s leaders. The state of the global economy will make it difficult for European states to make abrupt financial changes to their security policies. Under President Biden, Washington will remain committed ideologically to European defense, giving Europe some time to invest in revamped security. Although, Europe should not dawdle in the event the international geopolitical climate forces the United States to reallocate resources and attention. Of perhaps more concern for Europe is the possibility of a less sympathetic administration in the White House. In any circumstance, both the United States and Europe would benefit from a more equitable NATO, leading to a stronger transatlantic relationship capable of meeting the future’s international challenges.