Australia, Statecraft, and the South Pacific

Statecraft, the application of practical tools to achieve transformational objectives, is critical for the immediate and long-term future of Australian foreign policy. Its practice is becoming more important for Australia in securing defense capabilities and alliances that offset potential confrontation with China, and in conducting itself while attempting to sustain influence in the South Pacific. Australia remains a “partner of choice” in terms of development assistance in the South Pacific region, and is considered to be its regional leader.

The South Pacific, comprising 16 diverse and geographically dispersed nations, is now a theatre of great power competition. The Solomon Islands, brought into focus due to China’s activities which provoked internal unrest, have been at its strategic epicenter over the past two years.

Beijing has not stopped there. It has attempted to thread its Solomon Islands approach through 10 other South Pacific states, proposing a region-wide, security-focused, five-year deal that covers digital surveillance communications, police training, and other cybersecurity tools. While China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, was unable to secure the agreement earlier this year,  it is only a matter of time before such an agreement is delivered, given the groundwork China has prepared and the appetite among some Pacific leaders for direct assistance. Such activity has triggered an overdue response from US Vice President Kamala Harris, announcing a US “South Pacific strategy” that, at least on face value, speaks to a significant change in direction – increased aid funding, greater diplomatic presence and more people-to-people bonds through, for example, the return of Peace Corps volunteers to the region.

Both Beijing and the United States's efforts bring focus to Australia’s South Pacific engagement. There are certain activities that Australia does well. For instance, Australian troops were the first port of call in late 2021 when Honiara, the capital of the Solomon Islands, descended into unrest, not to mention the nearly $3 billion spent as part of the broader Solomon Islands assistance package over 14 years. Australia’s profile and its sport diplomacy continue to be important in the region, and people-to-people links remain overwhelmingly positive, especially with the region’s largest nation Papua New Guinea (PNG), as Australia is the largest aid donor to the region.

But more of the same aid and engagement will not do, especially as Beijing procures and expands its influence. This is where statecraft becomes critical. According to a recent Foreign Affairs essay by former US State Department official Eliot Cohen, ‘statecraft’ in its contemporary sense “means an approach that embodies a fine-grained comprehension of the world, the ability to quickly detect and respond to challenges, a penchant for exploiting opportunities as they arise, and, behind all of this, effective institutions for the formulation and conduct of a nimble foreign policy.”

Three recent examples demonstrate how the Australian Government has applied statecraft as an approach in the South Pacific.

First, the speculated potential takeover of PNG Digicel by China Mobile in late 2021 provoked quick thinking from Australian intelligence agencies, senior Ministers, and Telstra, and resulted in Telstra’s $2.4 billion government-backed acquisition guarantee.

Next is the joint 2015 Australia-Japan-US counteroffer for Huawei’s construction of PNG’s domestic ‘Kumul’ submarine cable. Although unsuccessful, the counterbid exemplified the links between seizing immediate opportunity, bureaucratic decisiveness, and trilateral cooperation, all important elements in twenty-first century statecraft.

The last example is Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s 2013 agreement with the PNG Government to process illegal maritime arrivals (IMAs) at Manus Province, PNG. The agreement ended onshore processing and nullified the flow of IMAs and the people smuggling trade to Australia.

All examples, although PNG focused, point to transformational results delivered through the application of Australian statecraft – an acceptance of strategic reality, real-time immediate responses, an exploitation of opportunities, and, importantly, institutional endorsement in the pursuit of national objectives.

Beyond these examples, however, there are arguably few immediate additional instances of the application of Australian statecraft in the region. There also appears to be a limit to new or creative ideas that can bolster statecraft. Two common concepts in Australian foreign policy and development commentary are to turn the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade into a central agency of the federal government, and to increase the diplomatic and development budget to percentage points in line with other nations. Arguments such as these miss the mark as they speak to theoretical benchmarks and not so much national objectives nor the application of practical tools to seize event opportunities and transform situations.

Another setback in the application of statecraft is defense strategy, or at least its practice. In Senator Jim Molan’s recent book Danger on our Doorstep, for example, Molan complains of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update’s ‘Shape, Deter, Respond’ model, which he says is conceptually sound but lacks a delivery pathway and cross-ministerial portfolio buy-in.

To invigorate Australia’s statecraft agenda, there are three elements for current and future governments and non-government entities to consider.

First, statecraft proponents talk of the importance of mindset. Ministers with little exposure to defense, for example, or even the National Security Committee of Cabinet will need to think creatively in ways that their portfolios can contribute to the ‘Shape, Deter, Respond’ model within the South Pacific.

Second, Australian leaders will need to find the right balance between direction and endorsement without overreaching, especially as it relates to the personnel they direct. Interagency teams are important here. They consist of cross-sector personnel that possess direct reporting lines to senior decision-makers. As former United States special negotiator Dennis Ross notes, such teams were important in United States diplomatic and statecraft successes during Angolan and Namibian independence under Ronald Reagan, the Bosnia peace process under Bill Clinton, and in various breakthroughs as part of the Middle East peace process. 

Third, enable a high level of direct discretion. This may come in the form of discretionary funding for Australia’s high commissioners or consuls that fit a certain criterion and will equip people closer to the action. Fostering “guerrilla diplomacy” that enables agility in the face of quick wins, especially those that do not always need Canberra approval, will be important in the region.

While common sense statecraft is difficult in practice, there are good examples to build upon, and the South Pacific region, with its shifting geopolitical currents, will necessitate expanded forms of its application. 

Author: Sean Jacobs

Managing Editor: Aidan Christopherson

Web Editor: Anusha Tamhane