The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Leadership’s Use and Abuse of the Cultural Revolution’s Memories to Justify the Tiananmen Crackdown and Arrest of Marxist Students

Background and Introduction

In the words of historian Margaret MacMillan, while historical analogies simplify a complex past, such simplification could lead to the abuse of history by interpreting only one of the many pasts to justify present political needs.

The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) is remembered in China as a chaotic political disaster initiated by the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s first-generation leader Mao Zedong. The chaotic period was marked by the decimation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) State’s institutions amid Red Guard factions fighting against each other, all in the name of Mao’s continuous revolution. The violence not only devastated the PRC’s economy, education system, and industries, but also led to the purge of senior leaders like Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Xi Zhongxun (Xi Jinping’s Father), etc. After Mao’s death in 1981, the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Out Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China – a document setting the CCP’s official position on its history – argued that the Cultural Revolution constituted “the most severe setback” suffered by the Party and the state. Yet, the document argues that Mao remained a “great proletarian revolutionary” despite his mistakes. The main accusations were placed on Mao’s wife and her colleagues.

In essence, while the Party acknowledged Mao’s responsibilities, his successors were more concerned about the social instability and rebellions against the state authority that occurred during the Cultural Revolution than Mao’s tyranny. Based on this background, this essay will investigate how CCP leaders since 1981 used and abused the Cultural Revolution’s memories to justify the 1989 Tiananmen Crackdown and the recent persecution of Marxist students. 

Tiananmen Crackdown

On the evening of June 3, 1989, Mao’s successor Deng Xiaoping ordered the Chinese military to enter downtown Beijing and forcefully clear the two-month long pro-democracy protest. Inflation, widespread discontent with corruption, and demands for greater government accountability were the root causes of the protest. However, Deng’s belief that the protesters sought to overthrow the Party-State led him to draw convenient analogies with Mao’s Red Guards that caused the Cultural Revolution. For example, from both Deng and Xi, the Cultural Revolution “has become so convenient a catchphrase that it obscures how many different things the years 1966 to 1976 involved.” 

It was on such an interpretation that Deng saw the liberal protesters at Tiananmen as a new generation of Red Guards. For Deng, China’s economic and political reforms were meant to strengthen the Party, not weaken it. He also believed that democracy without the government’s guidance could only lead to chaos. In essence, when U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz visited Beijing immediately after the Tiananmen Massacre, Deng explained that had he not ordered the military to clear Beijing’s streets forcefully, and that there would surely be another Cultural Revolution, with protesters themselves being the perpetrators.

Deng’s justification of using deadly force resonates with MacMillan’s warning regarding politicians’ over-simplification of a complex past to serve political needs, such as Deng’s belief in the necessity of a strong Party State as opposed to a more participatory decision-making process when carrying out reforms. As a result, the use and abuse of the memory of the chaotic aspect of the Cultural Revolution played a role in Deng’s decision to use deadly force against the pro-democracy protesters. 

Xi’s Crackdown Against Marxist Students During the 2018 Jasic Incident

If memories of the chaos of the Cultural Revolution could be used to crush a liberal intellectual, such abuse of memories could also be turned against the very practitioners of Marxism. In July 2018, 29 workers from Jasic Technology in Shenzhen were arrested for attempting to form an independent union, demanding better working conditions and an end to the beating of employees. In August, roughly 50 Marxist Society students from the Peking University (PKU) and other top-ranking universities descended onto Shenzhen to support the 29 Jasic workers. Yet, by August 24, all 50 students were taken into custody. In December, police turned up to a commemoration of Mao’s birthday in his hometown of Shaoshan and arrested another Marxist student involved in the Jasic Incident.

In a letter to the activist, Ma Ning, the President of the PKU Marxist society – speaking in defense of the status quo – accused his subordinates involved in the Jasic Incident of “opposing [Deng’s] Reform and Opening Up” and “reversing back” to the Cultural Revolution. Ma’s accusation was confirmed by the Chinese dissident Hu Jia, whom the Marxist students had reached out to for support. During their conversation, the young Marxist intellectuals asked Hu to support them in a “reprise of the Cultural Revolution.” Although Hu – a liberal – loathed the students’ ideology, he nonetheless introduced them to foreign diplomats and human rights organizations, hoping that these students could check the state’s power.

The Jasic incident and Ma’s accusation demonstrated the Xi Jinping administration’s crackdown on efforts outside of the Party-State apparatus to practice Marxism and Maoism, despite Xi’s insistence that people learn about Marxist-Leninism. Accusing the Marxist students of reversing China back to the chaotic days of the Cultural Revolution is arguably a convenient abuse of history to justify his administration’s maintenance of absolute political control. Based on MacMillan’s argument, the crackdown on Marxist students following the Jasic Incident constituted the Xi administration’s wonton simplification of the Cultural Revolution history into a source of legitimacy. In this sense, Xi is clearly using and abusing the history of the Cultural Revolution and Marxism to justify his government’s monopoly of power even when such monopoly stands in contrast to his Party’s founding ideology. 

Conclusion

From the crackdown on pro-democracy protesters to the arrests of contemporary Marxist students, the CCP has misused the memories associated with the chaos of the Cultural Revolution to serve its own political goal, which is to maintain its monopoly of power. Since the 1981 Resolution, any attempt by political forces independent from the Party leadership could be branded as supporters of Mao’s Cultural Revolution and other perceived enemies of the Party State and subsequently persecuted, regardless of whether these political forces came from the left or the right. Thus, the Party has weaponized the tragic history of the Cultural Revolution to justify a new autocracy. While the West had a track record of anti-communism and turning a blind eye to rightwing dictators (as long as they were or pretend to be anti-communist) during the Cold War, one should not overlook autocratic regimes that frame democratic opposition as leftists to justify brutal crackdowns.