German Intel Estimates for Crimea: Deception or Miscalculation?: Part 1

The annexation of Crimea in 2014 made Moscow anticipate a similar reaction to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. One analysis suggests a direct link between Russian deception and the decisive surprise event on March 6 Crimean Referendum. A pattern emerges: Russia's strategic ploy is to make the opponent certain of the false outcome. Instead of increasing uncertainty, it increases certainty about this false option, where Russia would not attack Ukraine. One of the principal targets to cause such confusion and doubt is Germany, due to its geopolitical position in Europe and the balancing act that Germany has played between the West and Russia.

Contemporary Context

On 20 February 2014, almost eight years before the current war, unidentified “little green men” swept into Crimea, the Ukrainian peninsula adjacent to the Black Sea. An operation like this is common among emerging transnational threats, employing tools for gray zone (or hybrid) warfare, which can be defined as activities taking place between peace and war, making it difficult to cause a punitive response. Shortly after the annexation, a “referendum” was held where 95.5% of Crimean voters supported joining the Russian Federation. This development followed the Euromaidan protests of 2013, which developed as a result of Ukrainian's ardent disapproval over their government’s decision to suddenly not align with the West, but rather with Russia. This development sparked unrest and eventual war in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk between Russian-backed separatists and Ukrainians and ultimately led to a war between Kyiv and Moscow in 2022.

Some significant differences between the illegal Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 are the Western military support to Ukraine, the Russian ineptitude on the battlefield, and the Ukrainian's sophisticated counteroffensive. The United States, Europe, and their allies imposed sanctions on Russia for its invasion and facilitated its ousting from the Group of Eight (now the Group of 7). However, little else was done by the international community to take Crimea back for Ukraine, a country in political flux at the time. Additionally, Russia eventually adapted to the sanctions. 

For its part, Russia has insisted that annexing Crimea was an act of “reunification”, protecting ethnic Russian citizens on the peninsula. In Crimea and in pro-Russian, separatist regions in eastern Ukraine, Russia has pursued a policy of aggressive “Russification.” Actions like handing out Russian passports to locals, and suppressing the Ukrainian language and culture, to name a few measures, have become the norm. 

In hindsight, the lack of a unified response to Russia or its subsequent support of pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine allowed it to position itself for a recent full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Crimea was one of the vital staging grounds for the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022. In recent months, Crimea has been attacked by Ukrainian forces, including the Kerch Bridge and key airbases. There is even positing by some experts, such as General Ben Hodges (Former Commander of U.S. Army Europe), that Ukrainian forces will be poised to retake Crimea in early 2023.

(Continued in “German Intel Estimates for Crimea: Deception or Miscalculation?: Part 2”)

Author: Patrick Kornegay, Jr.

Managing Editor: Aidan Christopherson

Web Editor: Shreya Lad