German Intel Estimates for Crimea: Deception or Miscalculation?: Part 2

(Continued from “German Intel Estimates for Crimea: Deception or Miscalculation?: Part 1”)

Coming to terms: the German Question

This development raises key questions: was Berlin deceived or did it miscalculate due to its historic war guilt (die Vergangenheitsbewältigung) and efforts to work closer with Russia, change through rapprochement (Wandel durch Annäherung), in an effort to align with both the West and the then Soviet Union? Was it deception by Moscow to off-balance the West (specifically Germany) vis-a-vis Ukraine – at the Kremlin’s benefit? 

This analysis points to both since messaging by Moscow certainly caused confusion in Berlin. Rapid developments made it impossible to process and analyze incoming information correctly and the German government was suffering from mirror imaging. This resulted in Putin lying to Merkel.  This also points to many within the German government as being a Putinversteher, which refers to a tendency to want to understand Russia/Putin instead of setting limits on the Kremlin.

With regards to Putinversteher, this soft-heartedness for Russia has many possible origins. For example, German businesses trading with Russia often oppose sanctions due to their economic relationship, which is a critical factor in Berlin’s stance on Moscow. This has been a critical component of Germany’s foreign policy since WWII. Other influencing factors include fears of a new cold, or even a hot war, and historic ties to Russia. It goes back to the era of Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who pursued balance-of-power diplomacy with Russia and other European powers. Germany’s strategic culture is still highly affected by the Holocaust, and it is still not ready to ’go it alone’ and take a leadership role in Europe. Germany’s collective understanding is thus essentially held in place by the Holocaust discourse and framed within two concepts from the Second World War: ‘Never again war’ and ‘Never again Auschwitz’.

This strategic culture cultivated by Germany still plays a role in how it conducts its foreign policy and how it acts within the Western security framework. The soft sanctions after the Crimean crisis in 2014 were perceived by Russia as a weakness from the West, which failed to discourage Putin. Russia only understands the language of strength. Roderich Kiesewetter, a former Bundeswehr staff officer, suggested, “as a parliamentary democracy, Germany must develop a strategic culture: our society must understand the importance of security in all its dimensions and be prepared to define interests. We must create a connected societal understanding of security interests and bring the security policy debate to the center of society.”

Germany’s 20th-century history was a point of contention that the Kremlin, specifically Putin, used to frame his oppositional worldview of Russia against the West at the Munich Security Conference in 2007. At the conference, Putin described a world dominated by the U.S. He accused the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU of imposing their will on countries and criticized the eastward expansion of NATO into the Baltics. Following the speech, observers asked whether the world was entering a new Cold War. Threats such as this should have been a major indication of where Putin saw Russia in the post-Cold War European security framework, where he described the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. 

According to one Russian news outlet, NATO’s ambition to have Ukraine as its new member played a role in the Crimean annexation. Putin then said he found it impossible to let "NATO forces set foot on the soil of Crimea, a land of Russian soldiers’ and sailors’ combat glory." For Putin, the risks of Ukraine’s admission to NATO are to blame for current foreign policy tensions.

German Intelligence: Opening the Curtains

From an intelligence standpoint, the likelihood of a Russian intervention into Crimea had been discussed prior to the annexation by the Bundesnachrichtendienst, or BND (German Foreign Intelligence Service), which had, according to the Frankfurt General Newspaper, conducted assessments after the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. However, the possibility that Crimea could have been a legitimate scenario was promptly rejected. Could the BND have made a prognosis that Putin would annex Crimea in 2014? The actual decision to annex Crimea was allegedly made in Moscow 48 hours prior to the annexation. In order to know, one would have had to cite Putin himself as a source, says a senior security official. Even years before, the idea of ​​Russian military action had not been so remote from German politics. The diplomats just thought it was too unlikely.

 Die Zeitung (The Times) rejects the assumptions of surprise events occurring like bolts from the blue and that it was impossible to foresee Putin’s strategic thinking. It makes no mention that Russian deception was of concern. It even suggests that the German government need not have been surprised, as German intelligence had been warning the government that Russia might change its foreign policy from cooperative to confrontation.

Another aspect is the relationship between the intelligence service and the chancellery. Chancellor Angela Merkel had a distant relationship with the BND, due in part to her background as a former East German citizen and the legacy of the Stasi, the infamous East German intelligence service. Given that the Chancellery failed to provide a clear briefing to Signals Intelligence staffers on German strategic interests, a more critical self-assessment of executive control would have been in order. This lack of regular briefings to the chancellor, akin to the Daily Press Briefing at the White House, left critical intelligence gaps in government that clearly left their mark.  

Legacy of Leaders

Chancellor Merkel’s historic upbringing is one shared with Putin despite different outlooks. They both speak each other’s language. Merkel won a trip to Moscow as a teenager for her mastery of the Russian language. Putin perfected his German during his service with the KGB in Dresden. This shared history of the two leaders is critical when understanding the security dynamic of Ukraine prior to the Russian annexation, as Merkel was a key voice in denying Ukraine NATO accession at a conference in Bucharest in 2007. It has also been utilized to the Kremlin’s advantage, despite Merkel’s pragmatism. This shared past is now under scrutiny over Merkel’s legacy, who has refused to apologize for her dealings with Putin. 

"[The Russian annexation of Crimea] is an objective breach of all international laws and of everything that allows us in Europe to live in peace at all. If we start going back through the centuries and arguing over which bit of territory should belong to whom, then we will only have war. That's not an option whatsoever," Merkel said on Putin’s invasion of Crimea. Denying that her efforts with Putin were naive, she said, "Diplomacy isn't wrong just because it hasn't worked." 

Conclusion: Moving Forward

Russia’s decision calculus before 24 February 2022 likely incorporated  Moscow’s belief that the Western response would be weak. Chief among that calculus was likely the notion that Germany would not respond the way it did given its historic guilt, economic ties to Russia, and Russian disinformation efforts in Berlin. In a doctrinal shift in foreign policy that commenced after the Zeitenwende (end of an era) speech by Chancellor Olaf Scholz to the German Bundestag shortly after the outbreak of the war, Germany has now agreed to send lethal weapons to Ukraine, pivoting from its historic policy of not sending weapons to an active warzone. 

Germany is now ranked 4th in the amount of military aid to Ukraine. However,  one of the chief complaints from Kyiv since the start of the war is regarding the lack of main-battle tanks (MBT), to which Germany has responded by indicating they are waiting on Washington to do the same. Germany will now send its Leopard main battle tanks in tandem with other Western tanks, evoking condemnation from the Russian ambassador to Germany, who stated the move would cause, “irreparable damage to the already deplorable state of Russian-German relations.” Germany’s initial reluctance echoes the West’s ambiguity to its allies that Russia relied on in 2014. Although initially a similar pattern in 2022, albeit now with different results, this leaves open the question of Russo-German relations. Berlin must continue to work closely with its NATO allies to send lethal aid to Ukraine and show Putin that the West is 100% behind Kyiv in its fight for its very existence. There are also multiple areas within its security apparatus that need to be reformed. The longer Germany continues this strategic dance between Moscow and the West, the longer this war will proceed.

Author: Patrick Kornegay, Jr.

Managing Editor: Aidan Christopherson

Web Editor: Shreya Lad