New Kid on the Grid: China’s Price for Becoming the Poster Child for Nuclear Energy

The pace of China’s nuclear power expansion can be described as blistering, and not just in the metaphorical sense. Looking back at the past decade, energy expert Daniel Yergin details that “China has the most aggressive nuclear-development program in the world.” Having brought 29 nuclear power plants online from 2013 to 2018, and with ambitious goals to more than triple its generative capacity to 180 GW by 2035, China views the technology as a key pillar to its transition to a carbon neutral state in the fight against climate change. This Chinese commitment to developing capacity for low carbon alternatives should be encouraged. However, it should also be a major cause for increased concern and scrutiny over safety by the global community.

To many people across the world, the possibility of a nuclear meltdown is an ominous cloud hanging over the potential low carbon gains of nuclear power. The incidents of Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Fukushima Daiichi have branded the lasting possibility of disaster onto the psyches of entire nations and communities. More than three decades after the disaster, the 2019 Netflix miniseries Chernobyl was met with widespread interest and popularity. After Three Mile Island, the U.S. canceled the construction of 100 reactors. After Fukushima, both the Japanese and German governments initially abandoned efforts to include nuclear energy in their energy portfolios, though Japan's government reversed course in 2014. As demonstrated, nuclear meltdowns have a chilling effect on the industry, which, barring any monumental breakthrough in renewables, will stunt the ability of states across the globe to reduce their reliance on fossil fuels and subsequent emissions. As the largest emitter of greenhouse gases and a country heavily reliant on coal, China and the international community have much to gain from the increase in its nuclear fleet. They also have much to lose. 

COVID-19 exposed what many already know to be true of the dynamics of Chinese governance: the Chinese Communist Party suppresses and distorts the veracity of facts by exerting leverage over institutions under its influence. Transfer this institutional logic to a potential nuclear accident, and one runs into a serious problem. In order to effectively prevent and address nuclear accidents, states must maintain independent safety agencies. In 2010, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) labeled the Chinese nuclear safety regulator, the National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA), as independent. However, no other Chinese regulatory agency has shown signs of independent authority past de jure labeling. 

Additionally, according to the IAEA in 2016, the NNSA staffed only approximately 25 safety officials per reactor, while the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staffed 42 per reactor, above the world norm of 30 to 40. An adequate nuclear “safety culture” takes far longer to develop than does time to hire operating and inspections professionals. Such a staffing deficiency in the coming years of nuclear expansion places China and the region at a greater risk of potential reactor incidents stemming from lack of technical expertise, quality control along nuclear supply chains, and greater operating stress. While the COVID-19 situation does not involve harmful radiation being dispersed into the environment, it gives us worthy context for how to imagine a hypothetical response to a nuclear incident in China. 

To further complicate matters, Beijing’s push for nuclear dominance is not relegated to the mainland. Elevated to the higher levels of national grand strategy in 2013, the “Going Out” plan is an integrated pillar of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), wherein Chinese leadership envisions the export of 30 nuclear reactors to numerous Belt and Road states including Argentina, Czech Republic, Iran, Kenya, South Africa, and Romania. As part of the plan, both flagship nuclear power companies, the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and the China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN), champion the jointly developed Hualong One reactor abroad. With a generative capacity of approximately one GW, the third-generation pressurized water reactor is a potent tool in the fight against climate change, as it offsets seven million tons of CO2 per year in comparison to a coal-fired plant. The Hualong One reactor has already been deployed for two sites in Pakistan: Chasma 5 and Karachi 2. By exporting nuclear power abroad, China would ensure bilateral energy ties lasting decades with the countries in the BRI and position itself at the forefront of defining nuclear safety and proliferation norms. Beyond any geopolitical concerns, Chinese domestic construction and operation safety standards are likely to be imported by these countries. Deficient atomic energy standards, like radioactivity, do not stop at the border and should be a tremendous matter of concern for the international community.

Of course, this is not to say that authoritarian regimes like China provide the only circumstances under which a nuclear meltdown could occur. The mistakes leading up to Fukushima in Japan and Three Mile Island in the United States are counterfactual to this notion, and Beijing has, at least, vocally committed to addressing safety shortcomings in its 2019 white paper, “Nuclear Safety in China”. Additionally, the development of new technologies and adoption of better technical standards, such as small modular reactors (SMRs), will help to standardize operations and reduce the room for error. Already, the CNNC is actively researching and developing their SMR reactor, the Linglong One, which has the potential to replace 100 MW of power generation on the grid. Yet the dynamics of Chinese centralized governance and its insufficient dedication to safety still stand, leaving tremendous room for error. 

To ensure a reduction in risk, China should take steps to insulate the NNSA from political tampering by removing it from under the Ministry of Environmental Protection’s authority and condition nuclear support for states in the BRI on adherence to all IAEA safety protocols. Moreover, the United States, despite the ongoing geopolitical competition, should seek to help China build a robust safety culture and staffing capacity in a bilateral dialogue between their respective regulatory agencies, wherein the United States helps it institute the best practices. As the heir-apparent to the United States and France in terms of total nuclear capacity, China shoulders a significant burden for the future of nuclear energy adoption. It must maintain and improve its safety standards and procedures across the board while balancing its burning desire for international prestige and geopolitical influence. There isn’t much room for error. A single mistake in a reactor along the densely populated Southeast Coast in, say, Guangdong province could spell disaster with countless lives lost and another costly slowdown in the deployment of nuclear energy. This would not only affect China, but the greater international community, a cost China and the world cannot afford with the ensuing climate crisis.