For Stability’s Sake: How the CCP Stifles Innovation from Web Series to Technology
In August 2021, the Chinese Radio and Television Headquarters (中国广播电视总局) announced the newest series of regulations to which all future Chinese web and television dramas would be bound. This announcement, called the National Radio and Television Administration Office Announcement on Taking Steps to Strengthen Arts Programming and Relevant Personnel Management (国家广播电视总局办公厅关于进一步加强文艺节目及其人员管理的通知), states eight specific goals which aim at eliminating yin yang contracts, forbidding unacceptable aesthetics, de-emphasizing the focus on streaming loads as an indicator of quality web series, among other new regulations. The eight goals are sufficiently broad to allow a high level of oversight on the creation of new programming in general, but they are specifically tuned to alter the web series industry. Worryingly, this policy – even while seemingly frivolous – intimates that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership favors “control-over-innovation” policies. The heavier emphasis on control in Xi Jinping’s China threatens to lead the country towards a neo-Maoist model of state control in response to the perceived threat that innovation in economic and artistic development pose to the party.
As long as web series and the media are conflated with jeopardizing the future of Chinese society, innovation in entertainment will exist only insofar as producers can outrun the chaotic regulatory policies that the National Radio and Television Administration Office (NRTAO) announces. The efforts to exert more control on one of the country’s most popular forms of media demonstrates a critical conflict that the CCP faces: to control more of Chinese industry by vaguely defining the limits of acceptability, or to support possibly destabilizing, indigenous innovation by implementing a more stable and consistent regulatory environment. The Chinese web entertainment industry will be used as a case study to demonstrate this conflict between control and innovation that threatens both China’s continued economic growth and the stability of CCP rule.
Uncertainty About Regulation and Enforcement Keeps Quality and Innovation Low
The National Radio and Television Administration (NRTA) reports to the Central Publicity Department (CPD) – the highly secretive department that handles all propaganda and media censorship activities – which reports directly to the Central Party Committee – the committee composed of the CCP’s top leaders. Putting “an end to girly boys (娘炮)” and forbidding “yin-yang contracts” in the same announcement is not flippant. It outlines how top members of the CCP view the role that web series ought to play in Xi Jinping’s idealized vision for China and the steps the industry must take to lead society there. Film and television have been defined by the regulations and ideologies that were enforced before, during, and after creation of the piece of media in China. According to film scholar Zhuoyi Wang, films made during Mao’s rule (1949 - 1979) “to propagate the ideology of the [Chinese Communist Party] often had precisely the opposite effect at the time of or soon after their release” because of the internal ideological conflicts happening within the CCP. The uncertainty engendered by ever-changing and vaguely defined CPD regulations is, ironically, the only thing that can be assured for those working in media in the present day.
This uncertainty pressures producers to make web series quickly and cheaply to preempt possible regulatory changes. Idol-driven web series have thus become highly profitable despite low quality because super-fans will support certain idols by streaming shows in which they appear – a specific concern of the Announcement on Taking Steps to Strengthen Arts Programming and Relevant Personnel Management. However, when high quality web series are made that stretch the boundaries of acceptability and attain popularity even abroad – like The Untamed or The Story of Yanxi Palace – they can be met with swift criticism by CCP-approved art critics and subsequently removed from streaming platforms. For all the desire to “tell China’s story well” to the outside world, the CCP has demonstrated that control over its citizenry is more important than the global recognition China wants. Innovation is thus punished even within the bounds of censorship in China, pigeonholing those that want to tell more diverse stories while also affecting the profits that motivate streaming platforms to create content. The result is a high volume of low-quality programming that cannot touch upon ideas, costuming, or stories that could offend censors.
Limiting Innovation in Audiovisual Media Speaks to Larger Issues for China’s Future
Innovation can be inherently destabilizing. For example, the iPhone revolutionized how people across the planet communicate, shop, travel, invent, and create businesses, but it also decimated sales of other products such as digital cameras, basic calculators, the iPod, maps, and more. Innovative storytelling methods and content can alter public consciousness to affect the creation of new laws, give dissidents symbols to unite around, and lead to long-term international impacts. The reason innovation can be destabilizing is due to the fact that it threatens to be revolutionary – such as how the bloody path to labor rights was paved by the Industrial Revolution in the West and how Maoist thought led to violent insurrections and political movements. The CCP is acutely aware that revolution is nearly impossible to control, but this does not stop them from trying to curb it. However, pushing policies that aim to increase indigenous innovation while also holding the hammer of nebulous regulation over the heads of innovators is not a model that will translate to high quality or novel products. This regulatory structure ensures that those who dare to innovate may be sacrificed to maintain internal stability. These regulations announced by the NRTA are not simply a set of frivolous rules targeting silly idol dramas in China, but an obvious shift towards tighter state control on the lives of Chinese citizens and a populace that is further insulated from the outside world.
A more closed off, less innovative China is one that will feel immense internal pressure to continue economic growth without the means to expand into new markets with uniquely Chinese products. For the United States (U.S.), this pressure could translate into expanded corporate espionage efforts by Chinese firms to meet “Made in China 2025” high-tech manufacturing and innovation goals. U.S. policymakers should establish stronger security requirements for computer networks, locations, and supply chains in key sectors to stymie Chinese corporate espionage efforts that could arise from the changing regulatory environment in China. Government and organizational policies for multi-factor authentication for access to computer networks, stronger and more in-depth security checks for Chinese nationals working in technology and throughout tech supply chains, and greater physical security at organizations that research artificial intelligence, solar, and other aspects of the “Made in China 2025” plan along with recommendations from cyber and physical security consultants ought to be implemented country-wide. Overall, U.S. policymakers need to re-evaluate the role American businesses will play in international political and security competition with China as innovation and continued economic growth becomes a greater issue for the CCP.