The Sacred Defense and Public Health: The Revolutionary Guards’ Fight Against COVID-19

Iran is on the verge of experiencing its sixth wave of COVID-19 infections, an alarming development for a country already suffering from endemic corruption and debilitating economic sanctions. Various dynamics are compounding the dire situation in Iran. First, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s decision to ban American and British vaccines has hindered public vaccination efforts. Iran has fully vaccinated only 30 percent of the target population and is currently experiencing vaccine shortages. Second, economic sanctions, while not intended to impact Iranian public health, complicate the delivery of vital medicine and supplies. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran’s premier military institution, has skillfully exploited these conditions to expand its footprint in the Iranian public health sector, assuming leadership in the fields of vaccine development, vaccine center establishment, and medical supply production. The IRGC’s penchant for brutal repression, social control, and corruption makes its newfound public health influence a worrisome trend.

The IRGC portrays its intervention in public health as a revolutionary duty that reflects the ethos of the “Sacred Defense.” In the past, the IRGC has invoked  “Sacred Defense” as a pretext for intervening in the Iranian economy. The Revolutionary Guards are now applying the same strategy to its public health campaigns and COVID-19 related activities. The group has expanded its threat perception and national security prerogatives to encompass cultural production, economic activities, and now public health, raising questions about what this new development means for the IRGC’s power and status in Iranian politics. Complementing this revolutionary narrative, the IRGC also has the resources, facilities, and manpower to plan, operate, and administer the Islamic Republic’s anti-COVID-19 initiatives.

The IRGC’s ideological worldview and institutional interests are driving its tactics and strategy vis-à-vis the virus. The IRGC harbors a deep mistrust of the United States and supports Khamenei’s ban on American vaccines. IRGC Chief Major General Hossein Salami echoed Khamenei’s rhetoric and framed the U.S. and U.K. vaccines as potential biological weapons that should not be trusted. Consequently, the Islamic Republic is largely relying on Chinese Sinopharm vaccines to inoculate its population, recently receiving more than six million doses. However, these vaccine imports are struggling to meet Iranian demand, presenting the IRGC with an opportunity to play a crucial role in Iran’s much touted domestic vaccine projects. Iran’s domestic vaccine projects include the Fakhra COVID-19 vaccine (named after assassinated nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh), a project spearheaded by the Ministry of Defense’s Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research, and the IRGC-developed Noora vaccine.

The IRGC-founded Baqiyatallah University of Medical Sciences produced the “Noora” COVID-19 vaccine and initiated human trials on June 27, 2021 following 16 weeks of research. In September, the Deputy Head of Baqiyatallah University of Medical Sciences Ebrahim Motavillian announced plans to mass produce the Noora vaccine. By developing a domestic vaccine, the IRGC is cultivating its medical expertise, burnishing its scientific achievements, and projecting itself as a patriotic institution committed to solving one of Iran’s most intractable problems. The IRGC’s vaccine development project also allows the organization to secure resources from the government, advancing the institution’s financial interests and extending its patronage networks. While a stark departure from its origins as an ideological military force, vaccine development is the logical conclusion for an institution that views itself as a defender of the Islamic Republic from amorphous internal and external threats.

The IRGC is actively establishing and operating public vaccination centers across Iran’s numerous provinces. Highlighting the importance of the vaccination centers, IRGC Commander-in-Chief Major General Hossein Salami called on IRGC provincial commanders to operate IRGC vaccination centers 24 hours a day. These vaccination centers not only inoculate the population, but serve as bases from which the IRGC support local hospital staff and deliver essential medicine and supplies to the public. For example, the IRGC established 39 vaccination centers in the city of Rasht in coordination with local medical institutions. The local Basij, the volunteer paramilitary force subordinate to the IRGC, provided medical care alongside medical staff in Rasht hospitals. The IRGC has proliferated these vaccination centers and their concomitant services in the provinces of Tehran, Khuzestan, Sistan and Baluchistan, and others. 

In addition to its vaccination centers, the IRGC is setting up facilities to produce masks, gloves, and medical equipment. Sanctions have limited Iran’s access to vital medical supplies and as a result, the IRGC is filling in to provide these materials. IRGC-affiliated Fars News reported that the Basij Karbala Women’s Corps in Mazandaran produced more than three million medical masks and distributed them to the community, focusing on low-income households. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported that the IRGC-Qazvin province production facilities made 1,750,00 medical masks. The IRGC’s domestic production of medical supplies reflects its narrative of “self-sufficiency” in the face of U.S. sanctions.

The IRGC will continue to reference the “Sacred Defense” to justify its intervention in the Iranian public health sector, extract financial benefits, and solidify its social power by providing normal Iranians with critical medical services. Consequently, the United States should identify ways to reduce this newfound influence. First, the United States should alleviate some of the conditions that facilitated greater IRGC intervention. This means relaxing restrictions on the import of oxygen generators, masks, and other vital supplies, many of which require specific authorization by the Treasury Department. These actions will give Iranian medical professionals the equipment they need to tackle COVID-19 and reduce their dependence on the IRGC. 

Second, the United States and international institutions can play an important yet indirect role in undermining the IRGC  through the provision of vaccines. The United Nations (UN) is providing vaccines to Iran through the COVAX program co-led by Gavi, the WHO, and CEPI. The United States should work with other partners to increase humanitarian aid and Astra-Zeneca vaccine donations to the UN. The provision of safe, reliable vaccines may undercut the IRGC’s rollout of its Noora vaccine. The IRGC has not released sufficient data on the safety and efficacy of the vaccine and many Iranians have avoided domestic vaccines in favor of foreign ones. The Iranian government recently announced its decision to discontinue mass production of its Fakhra COVID-19 vaccine due to a lack of demand, a possible future scenario for the IRGC’s Noora vaccine. The increased availability of foreign vaccines serves the dual purpose of improving Iran’s COVID-19 situation and undermining IRGC vaccine production.

The IRGC is increasingly consolidating its control in all facets of Iranian society. The militarization of Iranian public health will exacerbate healthcare corruption, degrade the quality of healthcare, and give the IRGC more leverage vis-à-vis the general population. The United States and international partners should closely watch this space to mitigate the social, political, and economic risks of IRGC public health operations.