North Korea is a Nuclear Power with Increasingly Advanced Conventional Capabilities

Introduction

On October 12, 2021, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un reviewed a rare exhibition of nuclear and conventional weapons, an armament exhibition meant to celebrate the 76th birthday of the ruling Workers’ Party. While most of the attention has been drawn to nuclear-tipped missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), recent North Korean military modernization has not been limited to nuclear and strategic weapons alone. From surface-to-air missiles (SAM) to long-range artillery and tactical ballistic missiles, the hermit kingdom has also made remarkable progress in conventional armaments. Additionally, Pyongyang has been working hard to join the hypersonic weapon club currently dominated by Russia, China, and the United States. Thus, instead of seeing North Korea as purely a nuclear threat, the United States government and its allies need to adopt a more holistic approach to flexibly respond to both nuclear and conventional challenges presented by Pyongyang. 

Nuclear Weapons: The Old Story Getting an Update

Since 2017, Pyongyang has made remarkable progress in strategic weapons ranging from traditional ICBMs to hypersonic weapons. By November 2017, North Korea had tested more than one ICBM capable of hitting the Continental United States (CONUS). The most notable ICBM is the Hwasong-15, which has a range of up to 13,000 kilometers, as long as the payload could be miniaturized to 150 kilograms or lower. Meanwhile, Pyongyang detonated a nuclear device with a yield of at least 140 kilotons. In essence, by the time President Trump met with Kim in early 2018, North Korea was well on its way to achieve a credible minimum nuclear deterrence against the U.S. and other adversaries. 

In addition to ICBMs, North Korea developed a variety of medium and intermediate-range delivery systems meant to deter regional adversaries. For example, the solid-fuel MRBM Pukguksong-2 – which was successfully tested in 2017 and has a 1,300 kilometer range – puts most U.S. bases in Japan and Japanese cities within range. While all of Pyongyang’s ICBMs use liquid-fuel, which would require hours of fueling before launch, solid fuel missiles could be launched within minutes of receiving a launch order, giving adversaries much less time to react.

Recently, North Korea has fielded a solid-fuel short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) similar to the Russian Iskandar, which has a range of roughly 300-500 km. Should it carry a nuclear payload, it would become a tactical nuclear weapon. Additionally, Pyongyang has recently tested what appeared to be a hypersonic glide vehicle similar to the one mounted on China’s Dongfeng-17 MRBM. In this sense, Pyongyang is working to break the U.S.-Russia-China oligopoly in hypersonic weapons. Finally, North Korea has tested a long-range cruise missile similar to the U.S.’ Tomahawk, and could theoretically carry both nuclear and conventional payloads. 

Overall, North Korea has made remarkable progress in not only possessing a credible nuclear deterrence against its adversaries, but also developing an increasingly diverse set of delivery methods to carry out tactical and strategic nuclear strikes. These systems give Pyongyang a range of escalatory options, making it more costly for Washington and Seoul to deter, and if necessary, defeat North Korean aggression. As long as Pyongyang does not provoke an armed conflict that could lead to its own demise, the world will likely have to live with North Korea armed with an increasingly sophisticated set of strategic weapons. 

Conventional Armament Modernization: More Attention Needed

Although much-needed attention has been focused on Pyongyang’s strategic capabilities, the hermit kingdom’s conventional forces have also undergone significant modernization. In fact, some of the ballistic and cruise missiles mentioned earlier could perform conventional precision strikes if given access to state-of-the-art satellite navigation systems (GNSS) like China’s Beidou (BDS) or Russia’s GLONASS. Additionally, North Korea has long deployed large numbers of long-range rocket artillery as leverage against South Korea since the latter’s capital Seoul is located only 40 kilometers away from the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Thus, by simply resorting to artillery bombardments, Pyongyang could turn most of South Korea’s economic achievements in the past several decades into ashes in less than an hour. For example, two of the recently deployed conventional long-range artillery systems are the 200-km range KN-09 300mm multiple rocket launcher (MRLS) and 380-km range KN-25 large caliber MRLS. Both systems could strike U.S. and South Korea military facilities, as well as metropolitan areas and manufacturing centers vital to Seoul’s long-term economic prosperity, deep inside South Korean territory. As a result, the threat of advanced North Korean artillery cannot be overlooked.

Finally, beyond offensive hardware, North Korea now possesses a modern multi-layered air defense system that could complicate adversaries’ air operations over the Korean Peninsula. Chief among this system is Pyongyang’s new long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAM). One of these long-range solid-fuel SAM is the KN-06 SAM, which entered service in 2017 and is similar to the Chinese HQ-9 and Russian S-300 systems. Additionally, Pyongyang is working on another long-range SAM similar in appearance to the Israeli David’s Sling interceptor. When working in tandem with older short-range SAMs, Pyongyang could now complicate U.S. and South Korean retaliatory air strikes meant to support U.S. and South Korean ground forces during a crisis. Thus, during the initial stage of a crisis, Pyongyang’s air defense network could delay Washington and Seoul’s much-needed air superiority, an advantage that the U.S. military has enjoyed in every war since World War II. 

Conclusion

Due to the ever-improving ICBM arsenal that Pyongyang possesses, Washington and its allies cannot overlook Pyongyang's strategic capabilities. However, the presence of North Korean multi-layered air defense systems and long-range rocket artillery is just as concerning. As the 2010 Yeonpyeong Island artillery battle and the ROKS Cheonan Incident have shown, the initial stages of an armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula would likely be fought with conventional weapons. As a result, equal attention should be given to North Korea’s conventional military modernization, especially Pyongyang’s ability to flexibly coerce its neighbors. Subsequently, Washington and Seoul need to update their range of possible options to proportionally respond to provocations. For example, both Washington and Seoul could deploy systems similar to (but more capable than) the Israeli Iron Dome in large numbers adjacent to the Seoul Metropolitan Area and U.S. bases in South Korea to mitigate the threats of North Korean MRLS. And South Korea could invest more in long-range standoff precision weapons capable of hitting artillery and missile batteries deep inside North Korean territory, so fighter planes would not have to risk being shot down by North Korea’s long-range SAMs. With a much more developed economy, Seoul can afford a limited arms race to keep Pyongyang in check.