The Return of History? How the War in Ukraine Exposed the North-South Divide

With autocracies seemingly on the rise, the consensus on democracies was very different only 20 years ago. When Francis Fukuyama penned his article on the end of history in 1989, he underscored how liberal democracy proved to be the sole feasible form of government as all the other alternatives would ultimately collapse. His assertion came during the twilight years of the Cold War, a period where the West and the free market had apparently achieved total victory, resulting in a “unipolar moment.” Since then, Fukuyama’s theory has received backlash. 

Critics argue the rise of authoritarian-capitalist powers and the attractive alternative to liberal hegemony they present have the potential to resurrect history from its slumber. Others still highlight how liberalism failed to sustain itself in the West since populist and far-right figures in the United States and Europe have gained traction amongst a growingly disenchanted population. With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it seemed as if the ultimate coup de grâce was struck as liberalism failed to ensure the survival of its rules-based order on the old continent. Has history finally returned? 

Upon closer inspection, this does not appear to be the case, as the war has vindicated Fukuyama. NATO and European unity, which appeared threatened by the aforementioned populist rise, are stronger now than before the conflict. Italy recently left the Belt and Road Initiative, Finland joined NATO, while Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia have received EU candidate status. However, the war has highlighted how the liberal order has yet to actualize itself materially outside of Europe and the rest of the liberal Global North. While history has ended in the West, it continues in the Global South due to the issue of memory politics. 

The End of History: Is There No Alternative?

It is essential to recall how, according to Fukuyama, the end of history did not necessarily mean that all nations would fully implement liberal ideals. Building on Russian émigré philosopher Alexandre Kojève’s interpretation of German idealist G. W. F. Hegel’s philosophy, he noted how the ideological struggle of history was over. However, its implementation in the material world has yet to occur. Following the invasion of Ukraine, he emphasized this key point, stating that “liberal democracy will not make a comeback unless people are willing to struggle on its behalf” since those who grew up living in peaceful democracies “take their form of government for granted.” However, where the wounds of Soviet autocracy are still fresh, such as in Ukraine, the struggle for liberal democracy is underway. 

The Russian army’s failures on the battlefield coupled with Western resolve both illustrate the inability of autocracies to present a prosperous alternative to liberal unipolarity and how exaggerated the notion of a Western order in decline is. Even in European nations ruled by populist figures, the unity exhibited in the face of Russian aggression highlights how, when facing the existential threat of autocratic expansion, they can set aside their differences. 

As Russian economist Sergei Guriev noted early this year, “while many Western politicians openly praised Putin at the start of the year, almost none do today.” It is key to highlight how the aforementioned nations all lived in fear of the Soviet threat during the Cold War. Adopting the idea of a liberal order is easier thanks to this shared memory. Therefore, the issue of unipolarity can only be examined while also accounting for the significance of memory politics. 

Ending History for the World

The issue of memory politics is a double-edged sword. Just as Eastern European countries that lived under Moscow’s subjugation flocked to Ukraine’s support, nations that suffered at the hands of Western powers, particularly those in the Global South are less likely to commit to the liberal order and its doctrines. One should look no further than the decision of 35 states to abstain from the UN resolution condemning Russia, Brazilian President Luiz da Silva’s statement that “Zelensky cannot want it all” (in reference to Ukraine’s prewar territories), and Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s assertion that “Europe has to grow out of the mindset that its problems are world’s problems.” Quincy Institute analyst Sarang Shidore aptly encapsulates this sentiment, stating, “as the unipolar era that followed the end of the Cold War recedes, the Global South is coming alive once again.” However “its guiding principle this time is not idealism but realism, with an unhesitating embrace of national interests and increased recourse to power politics.”

Therefore, the war highlights how the diverging approach towards geopolitics is not due to any ideological differences but instead is rooted in memory politics. Far-right parties in Poland and Italy reaffirmed their support for Ukraine and Western Atlanticism, while democracies such as India and South Africa refused to condemn the invasion. The Cold War legacy of the United States and Russia still seeps into modern policymaking with the interventions of each state evoking colonial and imperial memories. Rather than politics, history resides at the core of the North-South divide.

While the end of history might have occurred in the realm of ideas, the issue of carrying it out in the material realm requires the West to confront its colonial legacy and its history of military interventions. Until this occurs, former colonial states will find it difficult to accept a rules-based order whose values are preached by the same forces that previously relegated them to the status of second-class citizens. The coup d’état in Niger and the subsequent reaction against France is emblematic of this. Therefore, in order to counter the rise of Russia and China’s autocratic approach towards multipolarity, forces in the West must confront their colonial history and address the geopolitical question from a truly international perspective. 

This process can only start with Western powers undertaking massive infrastructure development projects in the global south, thus fostering bilateral ties based on cooperative development. Since the ideological battle is over on the old continent, a pivot towards the Global South through infrastructure initiatives can help set the groundwork for future ideological projects. Rather than a unipolar order based around the United States, a truly global order based on global norms regulated by intergovernmental organizations can foil the multipolar rise. Consequently, a global concert of nations will emerge within the confines of a globally regulated body. Thus, for history to truly end, the politics of memory must be accounted for first. 

Author: Erik Piccoli

Managing Editor: Riley Graham

Web Editor: Jordan Roberts