Berlin, Paris, and the Prospects for Reforming the EU

In late August, President of the European Council Charles Michel attended the Bled Strategic Forum in Slovenia where he declared that enlargement of the EU was “no longer a dream” and hoped to see it carried out by 2030. The EU’s Enlargement Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi elaborated soon thereafter that while this was not an unreasonable target date for enlargement, it would take political will. 

Enlargement, however, requires reforming the EU to ensure that it remains governable. A joint working group of Franco-German experts recently reported on potential reforms for achieving three goals: “increasing the EU’s capacity to act, getting the EU ready for enlargement, and strengthening the EU’s rule of law and the EU’s democratic legitimacy.” The report makes several recommendations, including reducing the size of the College of Commissioners, moving all policy decisions to Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), and reducing the power of member states to block candidate countries. The report suggests that if some members block progress on reform, the EU could allow for opt-outs and for certain members to refrain from deeper integration. 

The process will inevitably be slow and difficult. Even in a differentiated system, unless a majority of member states remains committed to integration, the idea of a united and whole Europe could fracture. The EU needs to start this process immediately, but one crucial factor is missing: Franco-German unity. Given the multitude of crises currently facing Europe and the difficulty of achieving consensus among the EU’s 27 members, Franco-German cooperation is central to initiating reform efforts and in convincing other members. 

A Rocky Relationship 

In Germany’s last federal election, Olaf Scholz of the Social Democratic Party became chancellor, ending sixteen years of Christian Democratic rule. Since this transfer of power, the relationship between Berlin and Paris has been contentious, with numerous policy disagreements ranging across energy, defense, and economic relief sectors. 

The relationship reached a low in late 2022, amid multiple public spats. During an EU summit in October 2022 Macron repeatedly described Germany as “isolated,” following Berlin’s announcement of a massive economic recovery package with significant potential effects on the single market. Berlin and Paris also postponed their yearly consultation of government ministers after failing to find joint positions on several issues, including nuclear power and the Midcat pipeline, which would transport gas from Spain into Europe.

Earlier this year, Berlin and Paris feuded over energy policy, particularly the classification of nuclear-generated hydrogen as green energy, which faced opposition from nuclear-skeptical Berlin. The Macron and Scholz governments have also clashed over European air defenses, with Paris refraining from joining the German-led European Sky Shield Initiative. In fact, over the summer, Paris held a conference on air defense issues, duplicating Berlin’s work on this initiative. Their relationship has improved somewhat since late 2022, with fewer cases of open friction, but the EU’s “Franco-German engine” remains non-functional. 

A Cloud With a Silver Lining

Both countries currently face unstable domestic political situations. In Germany, the far-right Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) is polling as the second strongest party. The three-party coalition in Berlin–Social Democrats, Free Democrats, and Greens–is experiencing intercoalition policy battles and struggling to maintain its public appearance of unity. Moreover, Germany’s economic situation looks increasingly gloomy; a recent report by a collection of German economic think tanks revised expectations downwards, projecting that the German economy will shrink by 0.6 percent in 2023. 

Macron’s government is similarly weak, having lost its parliamentary majority in the 2022 elections. Moreover, France is experiencing polarization, with both the far-left and far-right making gains and undercutting the ability of Macron’s government to effectively govern. France has also faced intermittent waves of violent protests, first early this year over pension reforms and then in response to police brutality during the summer. In July, Macron was forced to cancel a highly anticipated state visit to Germany because he had to respond to the protests. Moreover, while the French economy is not projected to enter a recession, growth is projected to remain sluggish in both 2023 and 2024, with growth rates of 0.9 percent and 1 percent respectively. 

Although domestic politics present obstacles to focusing on EU-level reforms, they also create a dynamic that favors cooperation. Achieving domestic priorities is increasingly difficult, so both sides stand to gain from progress at the international level. Moreover, reforming the EU’s institutions matches their international priorities. Macron has been a champion for  rejuvenating the EU since the beginning of his presidency, clearly linking enlargement with the need for reform. According to Macron, “the risk is to think we can enlarge without reform… I can testify that it is hard enough for Europe to advance on sensitive topics with 27 members.” Berlin has likewise supported EU reform, with both France and Germany supporting the expansion of QMV. 

Presenting a United Front

For France and Germany to effectively cooperate on promoting reform, two things are required. Firstly, they need to separate EU reform from other bilateral issues. The disputes between France and Germany over other policy issues, such as green energy and joint weapons development programs, will not suddenly disappear. However, such friction points cannot be allowed to cripple their working relationship, as happened last fall when policy disputes resulted in the postponement of ministerial consultations. 

Second, both governments should actively seek opportunities to assume joint positions and emphasize areas of agreement to reenergize their partnership, such as visits abroad. For example, before Scholz traveled to China in late 2022, he rebuffed Macron’s offer of a joint visit. Likewise, when French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna visited Yerevan following Azerbaijan’s lightning offensive, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock received an invitation to accompany her. Such opportunities that arise in the future need to be seized. 

Developing functional reform proposals and achieving consensus at the EU level will be a long process, but it must begin now. If Berlin and Paris cannot reset their relationship and present a united front on reshaping the EU, any reform proposals will be doomed from the start. The next election in France is in 2027; Germany’s will be in late 2026. Therefore, since Macron and Scholz’s governments will likely be working with each other for the foreseeable future, there is no better time than the present to begin building a united front. 

Author: Ian Cameron

Managing Editor: Alexander Sarchet

Web Editor: Daniella Ciniglio