What the U.S. Election Means for Africa, Part I: Trump

The historically large field of candidates for the U.S. Democratic Party’s nomination has been reduced to nominee Joe Biden. The staple theaters of U.S. foreign policy—the Middle East, East Asia, and Europe—have all featured prominently in televised debates and interviews and are featured  in IAR’s 2020 Foreign Policy guide. However, almost no attention has been paid to the African continent. The subject of future U.S.-Africa relations under either a Trump or Biden administration is therefore ripe for speculation. 

This subject requires the important disclaimer that Africa is an incredibly diverse continent and conceptualizing it as a monolithic political and cultural entity is foolish. With that being said, practicality and policy precedent mean that the United States often approaches the continent as just one operational space. Case in point, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) was created during the War on Terror to consolidate military operations on the continent, especially given the spillover of Islamic terrorism into North Africa. Under Trump, however, confidence in U.S. security assistance on the continent is relatively low; the Trump administration has planned to withdraw from military positions in Africa, presumably to refocus on China.  This is troubling as the U.S. special operations presence in the Sahel is considered a vital source of intelligence for the transnational counterinsurgency campaign addressing the security crisis in the region. This effort has primarily been led by fellow NATO member France and the states that once belonged to French West Africa. It is not out of the question that the Trump administration is planning to deliberately withdraw from the Sahel as part of its general skepticism towards its commitment to NATO; in a similar political move, the President directed the withdrawal of U.S. troops from longtime host nation Germany, which he described as being ‘delinquent’ on defense spending. However, In terms of direct change in the United States’ policy toward Africa, relatively little has happened under Trump; U.S. observers note that Congress and the existing diplomatic apparatus have largely continued most aspects of U.S.-Africa relations uninterrupted, including most USAID programs and the flagship African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), first passed under President Bush in 2000. In early 2018, bipartisan pressure from Congress forced the administration to roll back its request for a $252 million cut to the Center for Disease Control’s Ebola response program. 

Three main criticisms surround Trump’s Africa policy. First, the administration has essentially gutted the diplomatic capabilities of the State Department by refusing to fill vacancies, with a 10-18% staff vacancy rate in Africa, including ambassador positions. While it is unclear exactly how much damage these vacancies are doing to U.S. diplomacy on the continent,  there is no denying that the effectiveness of the diplomatic apparatus is being weakened. 

Second, the administration’s sheer disregard for decorum and respect towards African countries and their citizens has soured African attitudes toward the United States. From the infamous travel and visa restrictions against predominantly Muslim countries on the continent to the President’s reported description of African countries as “shitholes” that “send us people they don’t want,” there is a recognized feeling in African societies that the president openly looks down on African governments and people. Again, it is difficult to gauge what such comments and the ensuing cooling of African attitudes toward Washington mean in practical terms, but clearly they hinder U.S. engagement with the continent. 

Third, the administration’s framing of U.S.-Africa relations as merely an extension of its own great power rivalry with China, which has heavy economic investments on the continent in a bid to gain influence, has made some claim that Trump cares little about Africa outside great power politics. Regardless of whether it is wise to compete with China for influence in Africa, the notion that African countries are seen by the Trump administration as pieces on a chessboard has been received extremely poorly, with some observers contending that such rhetoric directly harms U.S.-Africa relations. 

Despite a potentially poor image of the administration, most African nations are willing to put this aside in pursuit of opportunities for economic and commercial growth. For this reason, the Trump administration’s make-or-break moment on the continent will come through its flagship “Prosper Africa” program. Prosper Africa was announced in 2018 by then-National Security Advisor John Bolton as a direct alternative to an economic partnership with China. Likely because of the poor response to this framing, Prosper Africa is now billed as a “one-stop shop” for the many different services offered by the U.S. government to American companies seeking business opportunities in Africa. So far, Prosper Africa has received relatively little funding, and a corresponding lack of services means  it is more of a repository for information than an actual instrument of business development. However, this could soon change substantially; in early July, it was announced that the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), a relatively new and well-funded development agency dedicated to facilitating international private investment, would be establishing a regional team based in Africa. If implemented effectively, the DFC Africa team might be the most impactful initiative in U.S.-Africa business relations since the passage of the AGOA nearly 20 years ago. A simultaneous announcement of an investment summit for African heads of state at the White House in September is an encouraging sign, especially given the relative lack of high-level visits between U.S. and African officials. 

If a second Trump administration does not push potential African partners away with diplomatic slights, then serious progress could be made in U.S.-Africa relations via Prosper Africa. However, an integral part of the Trump administration’s “America First” domestic posturing is a broad rejection of multilateralism. This is particularly problematic in the case of Africa due to the continent’s well-established efforts towards multilateralism, best exemplified by the African Union (AU), the various regional economic communities (RECs), and  the new African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The AfCFTA came into being in 2019 and is the largest trade bloc to ever exist outside of the World Trade Organization. It is estimated that the AfCFTA could increase intra-African trade by as much as 52% by 2022. Despite this major development, the Trump administration has not made any mention of how Prosper Africa will incorporate the AfCFTA. If the Trump administration deliberately ignores the new free trade area in favor of bilateral negotiations, as it is currently doing with Kenya and several other countries in regional trade groups, then Prosper Africa may be substantially less impactful, if not entirely ineffectual.

It is difficult to predict how a specific administration will end up shaping U.S. foreign relations – especially this administration. Nevertheless, certain trends are likely. It would be difficult for President Trump to significantly change Africa policy with only four more years in office without having to face significant roadblocks from Congress, especially if the Senate changes hands to the Democratic Party. The administration may be able to foster the kind of U.S.-Africa business relations that African leaders have been requesting for years, which could be a huge boon to favorability and precedent on the continent. However, these efforts could be undermined by both Trump’s own displays of bigotry and his administration’s general antipathy toward multilateralism.