Pakistan’s role in the War on Terror: A Degenerative or a Progressive One?
Abstract
This paper aims to delineate the contours of Pakistan’s “war on terror.” Initially a reluctant ally of the US, Pakistan is now actively involved in the war. Regarded as an important partner of the US, Pakistan has been receiving American support, both financial and military, to wage the war. During the last ten years, though military rule has given way to a democratically elected government in Pakistan, its “war on terror” has continued unabated. With the passage of time, this war has evolved as a complex, multi-tiered military operation spread across a large territory. However, Islamabad’s counterterrorism policies underwent significant changes, thus influencing the outcomes of the war. In order to assess the role of Pakistan in this decade-long war, this paper describes how these policy changes led to tectonic shifts in Pakistan’s mode of countering terrorism.
Introduction
“You are either one hundred percent with us or one hundred percent against us – there is no grey area,” stated Richard Armitage, the United States (US) deputy secretary of state, while briefing Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmed, Pakistan’s Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) chief, on September 12, 2001.1 Immediately after this high level briefing, General Ahmed pledged Pakistan’s assistance in the “war on terror,” which America initiated in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Subsequently, that war has developed into a multi-layered, complex military operation pitting the Pakistani and the American armies against a number of terrorist organizations operating within Pakistan. Little by little, the nature of the operation changed dramatically.
In order to develop a proper understanding of Pakistan’s role in the “war on terror,” one needs to analyze the different stages of its evolution. Initially, Pakistan served as a cooperative ally of the US in waging the war, but over time it reached accommodations with various terrorist outfits for strategic reasons. A detailed account of Islamabad’s counterterrorism policy illustrates the notion that Pakistan has a selective and biased approach in uprooting terrorism. The execution of Osama bin Laden was a path-breaking event in the “war on terror” with noteworthy implications for international terrorism. Given these dynamics, it is fair to conclude that Pakistan has not proven itself capable of dealing with and curbing terrorism, as such.
Getting Engaged in the War on Terror
Within hours of the deadly September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the US administration concluded that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda operatives from Afghanistan were behind the attacks and that any successful counterstrike required the support and assistance of Pakistan. On September 13, 2001, the US handed Pakistan a formal list of demands in the form of a “non paper.”2 It categorically asked Pakistan to:
• Stop al-Qaeda operatives coming from Afghanistan to Pakistan, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan and end all logistical support for Osama bin Laden.
• Give blanket over flight and landing rights to US aircrafts.
• Give the US access to Pakistani naval and air bases and to the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
• Turn over all intelligence and immigration information.
• Condemn the September 11 attacks and curb all domestic expressions of support for terrorism.
• Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop Pakistani volunteers from going into Afghanistan to join the Taliban.
• Break diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime and provide full support to the US in the “war on terror.”3
General Pervez Musharraf, then military ruler of Pakistan, informed the nation on September 19 that since plausible evidence suggested that the terrorists were al-Qaeda operatives entrenched in Afghanistan, the US had asked the Pakistan government to provide intelligence, logistical support and the right to use Pakistani airspace for strikes on al-Qaeda targets. Musharraf agreed to Washington’s request, without any knowledge of American future operational plans. Defying the US in the aftermath of the horrific events of September 11 would be interpreted as evidence of a direct association between Pakistan and the actions of al-Qaeda.4
The links between al-Qaeda and the Taliban forced Islamabad to choose between being identified as a co-conspirator with the named band of terrorists and acquiescing to the American call to sever ties with the regime of Mullah Mohammed Omar. Pakistan provided the Americans with use of several military airstrips near the Afghan frontier.5 Musharraf had committed Pakistan to the “war on terror.” The Pakistani army had to be reorganized to be more compatible with American interests in the “war on terror,” and this prompted Musharraf to do more than change the chief of the ISI. In October, he extended his term as Chief of the Army Staff and reshuffled all the key positions in the Pakistani army. Pakistan’s decision to join the US and the international coalition, according to the General, was deliberate and taken in pursuit of a “just course.”6 The “war on terror,” he cautioned, could not be confined only to Afghanistan. It must also take into account other areas where tactics that inspire terror have been used such as Kashmir, Palestine and Chechnya.7
The Result: Al-Qaeda’s Growing Presence in Pakistan
The following paragraphs give a detailed description of the escalating presence of al-Qaeda in Pakistan. This information has been derived exclusively from Richard Jackson’s book, Contemporary State Terrorism. I am thankful to him for such a vivid account.8
The “war on terror” came to Pakistan in the aftermath of Taliban rule in Afghanistan. Thousands of al-Qaeda fighters fled from the US bombardment of the Tora Bora caves in eastern Afghanistan, crossed over unguarded mountain trails and disappeared into the lawless tribal areas of Pakistan. By mid-December 2001, more than 10,000 al-Qaeda operatives, including most of the chief planners and presumably bin Laden himself, had managed to escape bombardment by American B-52s and attack helicopters that were carrying out attacks in the mountainous terrain of eastern Afghanistan. Another wave of fugitives entered Pakistan in March 2002, during the allied force’s ‘Operation Anaconda’ against al-Qaeda positions in the eastern Shahi Kot mountains.
There were not enough US troops to cover all possible escape routes and Pakistani forces faced serious problems sealing the border. Many of the terrorists made their escape by bribing Afghan warlords. They journeyed through twisting mountainous passes whose long history of smuggling links eastern Afghanistan with Pakistan’s lawless tribal regions and melted away among sympathetic locals. In many cases the soldiers looked the other way as foreign fighters crossed over to the Pakistani side and many in the ISI arranged safe passage for the fugitives. Herein lies the question of legality. The lawless tribal regions were beyond Islamabad’s rule; the government’s writ can only run along the main roads. Therefore, security forces could not set up checkpoints on unfrequented routes. Pakistani intelligence agencies did not have any effective network to check the movement of foreign fighters.
Osama bin Laden had around 3000 Arab fighters with him when the US- led coalition forces invaded Afghanistan. According to some estimates, only a few hundred of them were killed by the US bombing or taken prisoner. The 1500-mile porous border with Pakistan offered many exit points for the fleeing militants. Many of them used Pakistan as a transit to the Gulf and other Arab countries. In many cases, Pakistani security officials and Arab diplomats provided the fugitives with money and transport to get out of the country. However, most fugitives stayed in Pakistan. The non-Arab Uzbeks, Chechens and Sudanese took shelter in the tribal regions. Most al-Qaeda operatives found refuge in Pakistan’s crowded cities, like Quetta and Karachi. With the help of their allies among Pakistani militant organizations and supporters within the intelligence agencies, many al-Qaeda leaders moved to big urban centers from where they could regroup and revive contacts with operatives, both within the country and abroad. The Pakistani and American investigators were confronted with cells that were all over the place, developing a horizontal structure, without any apparent large center of coordination. Thus, al-Qaeda successfully mutated into a form that was no less deadly and, perhaps, even more difficult to combat. It was evolving as a hydra- like menace.
Countering Terrorism: Progressive Role
Hundreds of fugitives fleeing from Afghanistan wanted to turn Pakistan into a new terror base. A more sophisticated intelligence network was imperative to successfully counter the new threat. Although the ISI had vast experience in intelligence and counter-intelligence activities, fighting terrorism was an entirely new enterprise. Developments since 9/11 resulted in radical changes in the ISI, but it still took several months for the agency to develop a sound counter-terrorism infrastructure to track the terrorist network. Meanwhile, the network’s tentacles continued to spread from the inhospitable mountains in the lawless tribal regions to bustling city neighborhoods in the heartland of Pakistan.
The Pakistani authorities set up a new Counter Terrorism Cell (CTC) with the ISI to track down al-Qaeda fugitives. Headed by a Brigadier, the cell worked closely with the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CTC set up a swift-acting internal anti-terrorism department with specially trained personnel. Islamabad also established a National Crisis Management Cell, within the Interior Ministry to meet the new challenges posed by ongoing terrorism. Headed by an active-duty Brigadier, the cell worked closely with the FBI.
With new high-tech equipment and better human intelligence in place, al- Qaeda operatives lurking in Pakistani cities became more vulnerable to capture. The CIA developed extensive intelligence assets that helped in tracking important al-Qaeda leaders hiding in Pakistan. The agency also spent large sums of money on information. All of these helped to net top al-Qaeda operatives. For instance, various Pakistani intelligence cells in conjunction with the FBI successfully captured prominent al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah. This significantly set back further al-Qaeda operations. Meanwhile, Karachi, the country’s largest city and its commercial capital, had turned into al-Qaeda’s new operational headquarters. Islamic militants conducted more than half a dozen terror attacks in the city, targeting western nationals and US assets. All of these attacks carried al-Qaeda imprints. Even before 9/11, the militants used the city as a transit point to Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda decentralized its activities as American and Pakistani intelligence agencies attacked its nerve centers.
The masterminds of 9/11, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) and Ramzi bin al-Shibh, made their base in the city with the help of a vast network of homegrown jihadists. On September 11, 2002, Pakistani intelligence officials captured Ramzi bin al-Shibh at the commercial neighborhood of Karachi’s Defense Housing Society. This success was soon followed by the capture of KSM in the first week of February in 2003 at Pakistan’s western border city, Quetta. These high-profile arrests caught many US officials by surprise, giving Islamabad relief from the continuous accusations that Pakistan was not doing enough to curb terrorism. Musharraf’s growing crackdown on al-Qaeda’s command structure forced the terrorist organization to adapt in order to survive. As a result, the presence of al-Qaeda in Pakistan thinned. Many militants relocated to Iraq, in particular. Pakistan was no longer a safe haven for the terrorist network.
Pakistani Army’s Counterterrorism Strategy: A Paradigmatic Shift
On October 1, 2010, Islamabad shut down the supply route for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan after NATO forces inadvertently killed 16 Pakistanis.9 The unintentional deaths of the Pakistanis illustrated the inherent tension both in Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy and its allies in fighting the war in Afghanistan. Since the onset of the war in 2001, interpreting Islamabad’s counterterrorism policy has been tricky. Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy proved rife with inherent contradictions, caught between a proclivity to fight some militant forces and a willingness to maintain partnerships with others in order to strengthen its future bargaining position. Pakistan’s multiple interests—remaining engaged with the US, defending itself against Taliban attack, and countering India’s growing presence in Afghanistan—shaped its counterterrorism policy. Caught between these three goals, Ayesha Siddiqa argues, “Islamabad’s counterterrorism policy and objectives continue to lack clarity.”10 The primary flaw of Pakistan’s counterterrorism policy lies in the fact that it is defined and dominated by military and strategic objectives.11
In fact, according to Siddiqa, both the US and Pakistan lack clarity in defining the threat they are facing and the objectives they are pursuing. Islamabad’s counterterrorism policy suffers from its own set of problems, the most important being overemphasis on the military approach. The military’s incomplete control of Pakistan’s territory adds to its woes.12 The army is unwilling to extend operations into North Waziristan, which has now become a bone of contention with the US.
As a result of this confusing and opaque counterterrorism policy, three kinds of terrorist forces now hold sway inside Pakistan: the friendly or ‘good’ Taliban in North Waziristan, the unfriendly or ‘bad’ Taliban in North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Swat and rest of the country in the form of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other ‘friendly’ militants such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jamaat-ud-dawa (JuD) and Jaish-e- Mohammad (JeM). Such is the obduracy of the Pakistani army that the then-US commander in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, was unable to convince the Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, General Kayani, of the need to attack those whom the White House and Pentagon consider unfriendly. On the other hand, Pakistan seems to be pushing the US to negotiate with the Haqqani network, which it considers to be fundamentally significant to the future of Afghanistan.13
The military is not inclined to cater to the US concerns about the various Taliban groups operating in North Waziristan, who have formal and informal agreements with the Pakistani army not to attack the state if the army does not attack them. Islamabad does not want to start a battle on all fronts and is willing to talk to militant forces that do not attack Pakistan. Pakistan’s perspective is problematic for the US, which wants Pakistan to take a tougher line against the Afghan Taliban. However, the Pakistani military is making an effort to clear Swat and South Waziristan of militants and establish control with the intent of denying them to the Taliban.14 This “clear and hold operation” facilitates the state’s integration of these areas into Pakistan, as historically, these areas remained outside the state’s legal and political systems.
On the other hand, Pakistan has suffered terribly during the “war on terror.” Being the main ally of the US since the very beginning of the war in 2001, it was a fixed target of the terrorists. Militant forces have combined their strength to attack the Pakistani state and its citizens, resulting in the deaths of more than 10,000 civilians and security personnel since 2003.15 The militants, especially the TTP, have not hesitated to attack the Pakistani army headquarters in Rawalpindi and installations of the ISI. Since 2001, the threat posed to Pakistan by this militancy has greatly increased poverty, underdevelopment, and the ongoing conflict have made it easier for the Taliban to recruit foot soldiers. The following table illustrates the casualties suffered from terrorist activities that wreak havoc inside Pakistan: [Table note available in online format]
The threat posed by the TTP is difficult to counter. It is a franchise of al- Qaeda, with a similar structure, clearly indicating that over the years, al- Qaeda has managed to acquire a more local character. Amir Rana, an expert on terrorism, believes that the July 2, 2010 terrorist attack against a Sufi shrine in Lahore represented an internal scuffle for the leadership of al-Qaeda’s Pakistani franchise.16 Moreover, the Pakistani army is equally unwilling to eliminate other militant groups, which have found safe haven in mainland Pakistan. LeT got international attention because of its involvement in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, whereas JeM enjoys a long partnership with the army for what Rawalpindi considers strategic reasons.17
Another major concern that influences the Pakistani army’s counterterrorism policy is India’s presence in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s military establishment is of the opinion that India is fomenting instability in Pakistan’s southwestern province of Baluchistan that can only be checked by a policy of counterforce.18 The growing conventional and unconventional military imbalance in India’s favor compels Pakistan’s military commanders to continue supporting proxy war against India as a policy tool. The Kashmir issue is central to Pakistan’s military interests and LeT and JeM remain relevant to the army in this theater.
The Result: Degenerative Role in Counterterrorism
Musharraf’s growing crackdown on al-Qaeda’s command structure forced the terrorist organizations to adapt, breeding new militant Islamic threats in Pakistan that the security forces found harder to uproot. Several new terrorist cells emerged out of the outlawed militant outfits. However, the pressure on the terrorists gradually decreased as Musharraf faced a number of obstacles executing counterterrorism policies. The military campaign in Iraq increased already strong anti-American sentiment in Pakistan. Another major reason behind Musharraf’s declining support was the widely held belief that Pakistan did not receive adequate financial compensation in exchange for its cooperation with the US. The war in Afghanistan had hurt Pakistani industry and international aid did little to cover the costs of its participation in the war. Coupled with this is the stark reality of the fatalities that Pakistan suffered.
In order to address the situation, President George W. Bush in June 2003 pledged a $3 billion aid package to Pakistan to be disbursed over five years. This package is also tied to annual reviews of Pakistan’s cooperation in the war.19 However, in an interview with Time magazine in October 2005, Musharraf acknowledged that he was not eager for Osama bin Laden to be caught in his country.20 Faced with mounting US pressure, Musharraf, in February 2004, ordered his forces to launch a major offensive in the tribal region of Waziristan.
Despite Pakistan’s considerable cooperation with the US, however, the two countries’ interests are far from identical. The present policy of counterterrorism formulated by the Pakistani army continues to cherry-pick the various terrorist groups it will pursue on the basis of their tactical positions vis-à-vis the Pakistani state. As long as it does so, terrorism will continue unabated. Pakistani officials seem unwilling to marginalize or eliminate the core militant groups operating within the country. For instance, the chief of ISI, General Shuja Pasha, once declared Taliban leaders such as Fazlullah and Baitullah Mehsud as patriots and nationalists.21 Moreover, Pakistan regards the friendly Taliban as a natural boost to Islamabad’s drive to protect its interests, particularly in the Kashmir dispute and thwarting the growing Indian influence in Afghanistan. The US diplomats stationed in Pakistan believe that the continuation of the fight against terrorist organizations helps Islamabad extract money from Washington.22 On the other hand, the bulk of the Pakistani diplomats believe that the US interests in the region will wane when it withdraws its military from Afghanistan.23 Therefore, it arguably benefits Pakistan to keep the threat of terrorism alive.
“Geronimo EKIA”: Pakistan’s Role After the Assassination of Osama bin Laden
The killing of Osama bin Laden in a covert operation in Abbottabad by US Navy Seals on May 2, 2011, was a major blow to Pakistan. The notion that Pakistan’s intelligence agencies were unaware of the presence of the world’s most wanted terrorist is difficult to believe. The fact that bin Laden was killed on Pakistani soil illustrates the notion that Islamabad was either unbothered about his presence or was instrumental in providing safe haven. Barack Obama, during his 2008 American presidential election campaign, pledged that if there was “actionable intelligence” about bin Laden in Pakistan, he would authorize action with or without Islamabad’s help.24 Eventually, “Neptune Spear” (the code-name for the operation to eliminate bin Laden) happened without Pakistan’s help. Then CIA Director, Leon Panetta rubbed more salt in Pakistan’s wounds when he revealed that the US did not give prior notice to Islamabad about the operation because it feared it might be leaked to al-Qaeda founder.25 Pakistan faced major embarrassment as a result of bin Laden’s execution on its soil. Many segments of Pakistan’s political and religious leadership regard bin Laden’s killing as a violation of the nation’s sovereignty.26 Bin Laden’s death has also prompted many terror outfits to step up their offensive actions against the Pakistani state. Therefore, Pakistan should review its policy of fighting this war. In the words of Mariana Babar, a clamor is taking shape inside Pakistan “to review its strategies, stop treading in grey areas and treat a terrorist as a terrorist without getting entangled in the rhetoric of ‘your terrorist is my freedom fighter.’”27
Pakistani officials contend that Pakistan is providing the US with full cooperation in the war in spite of all the allegations and mistrust in the context of bin Laden’s killing. The authorities intensified reconciliation efforts to win the “minds and hearts” of people in their campaign against al-Qaeda and the Taliban militants. Dr. Maqsudul Hasan Nuri of Islamabad Policy Research Institute acknowledged the US commitment to eliminate the threat of al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other extremist groups, and argued that “Pakistan was being squeezed despite playing a major role in the decade-old war on terror.”28
Laden’s death has also prompted many terror outfits to step up their offensive actions against the Pakistani state. Therefore, Pakistan should review its policy of fighting this war. In the words of Mariana Babar, a clamor is taking shape inside Pakistan “to review its strategies, stop treading in grey areas and treat a terrorist as a terrorist without getting entangled in the rhetoric of ‘your terrorist is my freedom fighter.’”27
Pakistani officials contend that Pakistan is providing the US with full cooperation in the war in spite of all the allegations and mistrust in the context of bin Laden’s killing. The authorities intensified reconciliation efforts to win the “minds and hearts” of people in their campaign against al-Qaeda and the Taliban militants. Dr. Maqsudul Hasan Nuri of Islamabad Policy Research Institute acknowledged the US commitment to eliminate the threat of al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other extremist groups, and argued that “Pakistan was being squeezed despite playing a major role in the decade-old war on terror.”28
Laden’s death has also prompted many terror outfits to step up their offensive actions against the Pakistani state. Therefore, Pakistan should review its policy of fighting this war. In the words of Mariana Babar, a clamor is taking shape inside Pakistan “to review its strategies, stop treading in grey areas and treat a terrorist as a terrorist without getting entangled in the rhetoric of ‘your terrorist is my freedom fighter.’”27
Pakistani officials contend that Pakistan is providing the US with full cooperation in the war in spite of all the allegations and mistrust in the context of bin Laden’s killing. The authorities intensified reconciliation efforts to win the “minds and hearts” of people in their campaign against al-Qaeda and the Taliban militants. Dr. Maqsudul Hasan Nuri of Islamabad Policy Research Institute acknowledged the US commitment to eliminate the threat of al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other extremist groups, and argued that “Pakistan was being squeezed despite playing a major role in the decade-old war on terror.”28
The Dubious Future
Considering the gradual evolution of the costly, decade-long war that Pakistan has been waging, under the US pressure, against the terrorist outfits operating from its soil, it is clear that the complexion of the operation has morphed significantly. This stems from the protean nature of the hydra-like terrorist outfits. In order to pursue their objectives, the terrorist organizations changed their modus operandi, from primitive to more sophisticated, technology-based modes. Today they possess modernized weaponry as well as surveillance systems, enabling them to make their geopolitical presence felt throughout the world, particularly in the Middle East. Intelligence agencies worldwide fear that these terrorists will gain control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. The trend is transparent enough: terrorist activity within Pakistan is escalating and getting deadlier.
Further, it is worth mentioning that Pakistan has paid a heavy price for its involvement in this war by providing support, training and financial aid to the terrorist outfits operating on its soil. An advertisement placed in The Wall Street Journal marking the 10th anniversary of 9/11 stated: “Since 2001, a nation of 180 million has been fighting for the future of world’s 7 billion. Can any other country do so? Only Pakistan.”29According to official estimates, 21,672 Pakistani civilians have lost their lives or have been injured since 9/11 in 3,486 bomb blasts, including 283 suicide attacks. 2,795 soldiers of the Pakistani Army have been killed and 8,671 wounded. In addition to the high human cost, the “war on terror” has internally displaced 3.5 million people and resulted in the economic loss of $68 billion.30 Terrorism, therefore, has been haunting Pakistan in a Frankenstein-like manner.
Pakistan began as an unenthusiastic collaborator of the US in the “war on terror” and failed to evolve as a progressive ally. The bin Laden assassination in particular reveals Pakistan’s lack of commitment in living up to the expectations of the US with regard to the “war on terror.”
Endnotes
1 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America’s War on Terror (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005), 217-236.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan at Crosscurrent of History (Lahore: Vanguard Books Pvt. Ltd., 2004), 295-319.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Richard Jackson ed., Contemporary State Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2010), 119-140.
9 Ayesha Siddiqa, “Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Strategy: Separating Friends from Enemies,” The Washington Quarterly, Volume 34, No.1, Winter 2011, 149-162.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Abbas, 217-236.
15 “Pakistan assessment 2011,” South Asia Terrorism Portal,www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/#(13 July 2011)
16 Ayesha Siddiqa, “Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Strategy: Separating Friends from Enemies,” The Washington Quarterly, Volume 34, No.1, Winter 2011, 149-162.
17 Ibid.
18 “India supporting militancy in Balochistan” The Express Tribune, http://tribune.com.pk/story/60862/india-supporting-militancy-in-balochistan-musharraf/ (21 November 2012).
19 Richard Jackson ed., Contemporary State Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2010), 119-140.
20 Ibid.
21 Ayesha Siddiqa, “Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Strategy: Separating Friends from Enemies”, The Washington Quarterly, Volume 34, No.1 (Winter 2011), 149-162.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 “What the end of bin Laden means”, The Hindu, 3 May 2011.
25 Mariana Babar, “The False Prophets”, Outlook, 16 May 2011, 38-41.
26 Ali Abbas, “Pakistunned”, The Week, 15 May 2011, 42.
27 Babar,38-41.
28 “Pakistan making strides in the war on terror, say officials”, Straits, http://www.nst.com.my/nst/articles/41kami1/Article... (12 August 2011)
29 Anita Joshua, “In a cleft stick”, Frontline, September 24-October 7, 2011, http://www.flonnet.com/fl2820/stories/20111007282001600.htm (1 January, 2012).
30 Ibid.