Unraveling the Myth of Opacity: How Israel’s undeclared Nuclear Arsenal Destabilizes the Middle East
Abstract
This article assesses the utility and effectiveness of Israel’s nuclear deterrent and its policy of opacity. The research will show that Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal has not increased Israel’s security and has actually been a destabilizing force in the region in four ways. First, Egypt knew of Israel’s nuclear arsenal when it invaded in 1973, which shows that Israeli deterrence failed. Second, Israel’s nuclear status gave Saddam Hussein a strong incentive to pursue a nuclear weapons program in the 1980s and early 1990s. Third, Israel’s nuclear arsenal has led directly to the mass proliferation of chemical weapons in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Fourth, Israel’s policy of nuclear opacity undermines the (NPT) regime since Israel is the only state in the Middle East that is not a signatory. If US policymakers are serious about bringing stability and peace to the region they must pressure Israel to declare its status and sign the NPT. Doing so would not only strengthen the NPT regime but provide greater leverage in convincing Iran to abandon its program.
What effect has Israel’s nuclear arsenal had on its own security and the proliferation incentives of other states in the Middle East, particularly, Egypt, Iraq, and Iran? The following research will show that Israel’s nuclear arsenal has provided very little to its existential security, in fact, it has been a destabilizing force in the Middle East. Israeli nuclear proliferation caused President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt to explore the nuclear option and seek assistance from the USSR and China in the late 1950s and 1960s, it gave Saddam Hussein of Iraq a strong incentive to pursue a nuclear weapons program in the 1980s and early 1990s, and it may be a key factor in current Iranian nuclear decision-making. A nuclear Israel undermines the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and has led to the massive proliferation of chemical and biological weapons in the region.
This paper explores five distinct themes: a brief history of nuclear decision-making, a study of both reactive nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons in the Middle East, an analysis of the effectiveness of Israel’s nuclear arsenal as a deterrent, and a concluding assessment of the utility of Israel’s nuclear arsenal and the prospect of Israeli denuclearization.
Why and How Israel Acquired Nuclear Weapons
From the outset, Israel has sought nuclear weapons as a means to provide the ultimate security assurance against annihilation. The modern state of Israel was born into conflict in 1948 when a coalition of Arab states, led by Egypt, attacked it in what would be the first of four wars (the other three being in 1956, 1967, 1973), of which Israel always came out the victor. Within a decade of the atrocities of the Holocaust, the new Jewish immigrants to the newly established state of Israel now faced Arab states trying to drive them out of the Middle East. The Holocaust taught the Jewish people of Israel that they could not rely on allies but could only rely upon themselves. This perception was bolstered when Israel, along with France and England, was pressured by both the United States and the Soviet Union to abandon Egyptian territory gained during the Suez Crisis of 1956.1 Ariel Sharon articulated this sentiment by stating, “Israel has to have all the elements of power necessary to protect itself independently of outside aid.”2 Israeli policymakers viewed the acquisition of nuclear weapons as the ultimate means to guarantee the security and sovereignty of the Jewish state. The Israelis repelled the 1948 assault but knew their position was insecure and believed that only the threat of complete nuclear annihilation would deter the much larger neighboring Arab states from exterminating them. Ideally, a nuclear deterrent would force the Arab world to make peace with Israel.
In 1952 Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion established the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, essentially starting Israel’s nuclear program. President Eisenhower’s 1953 Atoms for Peace program provided Israel with its first reactor and valuable technology.3 However, this program was not enough to get Israel to the level of producing its own nuclear weapons. The United States did not want a nuclear Israel for fear of proliferation and exacerbating the Cold War.4 Israel looked elsewhere.5
The French agreed to be Israel’s nuclear supplier and covertly transferred the necessary tools and technology.6 France supplied Israel out of a desire to deter their mutual enemy, Gamal Nasser of Egypt.7 France also did not like the idea of a bipolar nuclear world and therefore was supportive of Israel’s right to become an independent nuclear power.8 In 1958 the Dimona Reactor was built in the Negev Desert and by the mid-1960s it was producing enough weapons-grade plutonium that, by 1968, the Dimona Reactor was able to put out 4-5 bombs per year.9
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was established in 1968. Israel refused to sign it and chose a policy of nuclear opacity instead. Opacity, the policy of neither confirming nor denying the existence of its arsenal, is a hedging policy that serves the Jewish state by insulating it from international law and condemnation while providing it with the ultimate security guarantee.10 Opacity theoretically prevents follow-on proliferation since, by not declaring its arsenal, Israel removes the incentive for other states to proliferate. In 1969, President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Golda Meir agreed that the United States would not condemn Israel for proliferating if Israel did not declare its weapons. The United States would essentially pretend to believe the Israeli’s did not have nuclear weapons, a policy that continues to this day.11
Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East
There are multiple models that explain why a state pursues proliferation. The three main models are: the “security model” (based on the realist theory of international relations) which posits security/deterrence as the main motivation; the “domestic politics model” which focuses on internal factors such as bureaucratic parochialism and enhancing domestic prestige; and the “norms model” (based on the constructivist theory) which emphasizes identity, ideology, and national prestige as the central driving factors.12 Israel’s acquisition did not lead to a nuclear proliferation “domino effect” in the Middle East as President Kennedy had feared. However, this does not disprove the theory that proliferation begets proliferation. There certainly have been attempts at reactive proliferation in the Middle East in response to Israel’s acquisition of nuclear capabilities.
Using the above theories, this paper will attempt to explain the reactive proliferation behavior of three states: Egypt, Iraq, and Iran. Egypt and Iraq were chosen because they both have fought against Israel and were the two most at-risk states for proliferation due to their ideology of Pan- Arabism. Syria has been omitted because it never had a serious program. What headway it had made was erased in the 2007 Israeli strike on its reactor, located in the Deir ez-Zor region.13 Libya has also been omitted because former leader Muammar Qaddafi abandoned his nuclear program in 2003 and chose the path of non-proliferation.14 Furthermore, deterring Israel was not an important security priority for his regime.15 Iran has been included because it is the only state that is suspected of actively pursuing a nuclear weapon, and President Ahmedinajad has called on the destruction of Israel stating, “the occupying regime must be wiped off the map” and labeled it “a disgraceful stain” in the Muslim World.16
The Case of Egypt
On the surface, Egypt had clear motives for pursuing a nuclear weapon. Prior to the establishment of the NPT regime, nuclear weapons were a pathway to international prestige. A nuclear weapon would have also provided Egypt with a powerful tool to deter (and possibly destroy) Israel and solidify Egypt’s position as leader of the Arab World. It would help promote Nasser’s ideology of Pan-Arabism, the idea of unifying the Arab people in order to dismantle the remnants of colonialism. Nasser even declared that, if Israel were to acquire a nuclear weapon, Egypt would be compelled to follow suit.17 He also threatened repeatedly to destroy the reactor at Dimona.18 However, Egypt chose the path of international diplomacy and became an active proponent of the emerging norm of non- proliferation. Egypt helped draft many of the articles of the NPT and was one of its first signatories in 1968.19
Egypt certainly explored the nuclear option but ultimately chose not to pursue. Egypt, like Israel, began a nuclear program in response to Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace initiative in 1954 but, unlike Israel, was truly interested in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. After losing the 1956 war with Israel and learning of Dimona in 1959, Egypt began to explore the option of weaponizing its program.20 In the mid-1960s, Egypt approached China and the Soviet Union for nuclear weapons and fissile materials but was rejected. The Egyptians also recruited former Nazi scientists to transfer fissile materials and technology to them. Israel learned of this and launched a successful campaign of assassinations, kidnappings, and sabotage which prevented this collaboration.21 Egypt didn’t have a domestic nuclear infrastructure to rely upon in the case of failure to secure help internationally.
President Nasser had many domestic concerns that affected his decision to not pursue nuclear weapons. Weaponization of a nuclear program is very costly and the government had little funds to allocate to it. At the time, Nasser was more focused on improving his nation’s infrastructure and standard of living. Much of Egypt’s resources were instead allocated to building the Aswan High Dam and a peaceful nuclear infrastructure. Furthermore, Egypt was fighting a costly war in Yemen. Nasser may also have feared that a nuclear weapon would strengthen the position of his bitter rival, Defense Minister Amer, who might have led a military coup.22
After Egypt’s humiliating defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War, the Soviet Union and China both pressured Nasser to abandon his nuclear ambition.23 Nasser knew the time had passed to get a nuclear weapon so he found it expedient to embrace non-proliferation and use it as a tool to shame Israel and pressure it to denuclearize. Nasser believed that this would bring Egypt prestige and legitimacy in the world. After he died in 1970, his successor Anwar Sadat continued on the path of non-proliferation and adherence to international law. Sadat broke ties with the communist powers and chose to integrate Egypt’s economy with the West, making a nuclear option all the more difficult and senseless.
By applying the three theoretical models it becomes obvious that Egypt did not need a nuclear weapon. The “security model” shows there was not a defensive security motive for a nuclear weapon. Israel was a bitter enemy of both Sadat and Nasser but neither leader saw Israel as an existential threat to Egypt’s sovereignty. The “domestic model” shows Nasser was more concerned with improving his own position in power through building infrastructure, and he also feared improving the position of his political rivals in the military and the Atomic Energy Establishment through the acquisition of a nuclear bomb. The “norms model” explains how Nasser saw that embracing the emerging norm of non-proliferation would reap more rewards, prestige, and influence than would a nuclear weapon. Ultimately, Egyptian leaders never seriously dedicated themselves to a nuclear weapons program because they knew that a nuclear weapon had little utility for Egypt. The costs of acquiring nuclear weapons outweighed the benefits.
Henry Kissinger once said “There is no war without Egypt, no peace without Syria.”24 The 1979 Peace Accords kept a relative peace between Egypt and Israel that persisted throughout the Mubarak regime. The current Egyptian president, Mohamed Morsi, a prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood, has already taken a tougher approach toward Israel. Regardless of how this plays out, the non-proliferation norm is so embedded in Egyptian policy, spanning back to Nasser, that Morsi is unlikely to change it.
Iraq’s Offensive Security Motive
Iraq presents a very different case from Egypt. Iraq started a peaceful nuclear program under Atoms for Peace in 1956, but after the Ba’athist coup of 1968, it began to pursue weaponization under President Saddam Hussein in 1979. Hussein, along with most of the Arab World, was livid that Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. After Egypt’s expulsion from the Arab League in the same year, Hussein seized the opportunity to fill Nasser’s role as leader of Pan-Arabism and expel Israel from the Middle East.25 Although Iraq became a NPT signatory state, Hussein was not interested in adhering to international law and norms. Saddam saw Israel as an existential threat to the security of the Arab states and believed that Israel desired to keep Iraq weak and technologically inferior.26 He envisioned a fifth and final war with Israel in which the Arab states, with Iraq leading the charge, which would push Israel back to its pre-1967 border and ultimately expel Israel from the Middle East.27
In order to wage this ambitious conclusive war, Hussein would need a nuclear weapon to deter Israel’s nuclear weapons in order to make conventional war possible. This is unprecedented because it is the first time a nation pursued a nuclear weapon for the sake of being able to wage an offensive war with a sitting nuclear power. Iraq had an offensive security motive but no defensive motive since Saddam Hussein believed Israel would never preemptively attack them. This changed in 1981 when Israel bombed the Osirak reactor. The effect was that it gave Iraq the defensive security motive to pursue weaponization. Recent documents acquired after the 2003 US-led invasion suggest that the reactor was not capable of weaponizing while under IAEA regulation.28 Iraq’s exploration before 1981 is often characterized as a casual “drift” towards a nuclear arsenal, but after Osirak it became a determined pursuit.29 Nuclear entrepreneurs were able to convince Saddam of the necessity of pursuing a clandestine route.30 By the 1991 Gulf War Iraq was very close to acquiring its first nuclear weapon. After the Gulf War Iraq lacked the infrastructure necessary to restart its nuclear program.
By applying the three models one can see that Iraq had powerful incentives to pursue a nuclear weapon. The “security model” shows that Iraq had an offensive motive to neutralize Israel’s nuclear arsenal through the logic of deterrence and thereby make a conventional war possible. The defensive motive of deterring an Israeli strike came after the experience of Osirak. Some argue that Iraq’s motives were equally influenced by a desire to deter Iran but evidence shows that Iraq was able to deter Iran through conventional missile strikes on Tehran.31 The “domestic politics model” shows that the Osirak bombing essentially “forged an alliance between nuclear entrepreneurs and the Iraqi leadership.”32 This alliance strengthened the Ba’athist regime. The “norms model” shows that Saddam believed a nuclear weapon would enhance Iraq’s prestige and leadership role in the Middle East and would increase Iraq’s independence from foreign powers. Hussein found it humiliating that Israel was technologically advanced enough to hold a nuclear monopoly over the Arab states and he wanted to close this gap.33 Finally, Iraq’s oil wealth gave it more leverage than Egypt to pursue an aggressive armament policy. 34
Iranian Proliferation Incentives
Iran began its nuclear program in 1957 under Atoms for Peace program. Even though the Shah was an ally of the West, he opposed Israel’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon. After the 1979 revolution Ayatollah Khomeini condemned and abandoned the Iranian nuclear program.35 Tehran restarted it in the mid-1980s during its war with Iraq, which lasted from 1980-1988.36 Iran has received assistance from Russia and China in its nuclear program. The greatest contributor to Iran’s program was the Pakistani scientist and nuclear smuggler AQ Khan in the mid-1980s. According to intelligence reports, Iran had been pursuing a nuclear weapon until 2003 when it came under investigation from the IAEA. Iran signed the Additional Protocol37 but has not ratified it. In 2006, however, Iran stopped adhering to the Additional Protocol altogether. Iran continues to produce gas centrifuges for enriching uranium which it claims is for peaceful purposes, although such a program could easily be diverted to weaponization without proper safeguards.38
Iran presents a very complicated case because it is difficult to tie its program to Israel. Unlike with Egypt, Iraq, and to a lesser extent Syria, there is no evidence that Israeli proliferation begat Iranian proliferation. Furthermore, according to the most recent IAEA report, the evidence does not clearly show whether Iran has explicitly violated the NPT in any way or is in noncompliance with the IAEA.39 Iran has not made any declaration to pursue nuclear weapons and still claims that its program is for peaceful purposes. The Iranian ambassador to the IAEA recently stated, “The [IAEA] report illustrates that all of Iran’s nuclear activates are supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and each gram of uranium is under control and is used in Iran for peaceful purposes.”40
There are multiple reasons to explain why Iran would want the nuclear option. It is possible that the regime is seeking only a “breakout capability” to be able to weaponize in short notice if necessary, as Japan and Germany can. Perhaps Iran wishes only to be a part of the “nuclear club” so it can be respected as a regional power.41 42
Domestic politics could also be a driving factor, as it was in the well- documented case of India. A nuclear weapon could bring great popularity to the regime among the Iranian people. The Pakistani people were extremely proud of their acquisition of the “Islamic Bomb” through AQ Khan.43 In the same way, nuclear weapons could justify the regime to the Iranian people and solidify its position on the domestic and international stage.44
From an offensive security perspective it could be speculated that Iran is seeking a nuclear weapon in order to launch a war with Israel. If Iran wants to destroy Israel with nuclear weapons this would be unprecedented. This is highly unlikely since the Iranian regime is rational in that it is cost- averse and cares about self-preservation.45 Israel has a nuclear arsenal to deter Iran. A nuclear strike on Israel or against the United States would be suicide and Tehran knows this. Ahmedinejad has echoed this. “What intelligent person would fight 5,000 American bombs with one bomb?”46 he asked. He also called the stockpiling of nuclear weapons “mentally retarded.”47
Nevertheless, Iran continues to support terrorist organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah in their war with Israel. Israel presents an ideological affront to Iran, and President Ahmedinejad has called for the destruction of Israel.48 But most analysts consider conflict unlikely and take this as mere rhetoric.49 Iran has never fought a war with Israel, nor do the two states share a border. Iran, being non-Arab and Shiite, has few allies in the Middle East except for the beleaguered Assad regime in Syria, and has no interest in promoting Pan-Arabism, the anti-colonial ideological impetus that drove Nasser and Hussein to seek the destruction of Israel. The nations have a more positive history of cross-cultural contributions since antiquity, when the Persian emperor Cyrus the Great freed the Jewish people from Babylonian captivity.
If Iran wants a nuclear weapon it would be for defensive purposes in accordance with the historical norm.50 The regime has cause to feel insecure. It has a nuclear Sunni Muslim neighbor, Pakistan. Iran’s only ally is the Assad regime in Syria, itself a pariah bogged down in a civil war. Iran’s biggest fear is the United States, which has invaded two of Iran’s neighbors, labeled it an “axis of evil” state and, along with Israel, continually threatens Tehran while the US Navy floats off its shores.51
Memories of the Osirak strike and the 2007 strike in Syria contribute to Iran’s sense of insecurity since Israel has proven the credibility of its threats. The fact that Iran has hardened so many of its nuclear sites shows that it takes this threat seriously. The Iranian regime has seen Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qaddafi toppled by the West while the nuclear- armed North Korean regime remains unthreatened.52 The message to Tehran is clear: nuclear deterrence works.
Israel’s undeclared nuclear monopoly in the Middle East is certainly a factor in Iranian proliferation but it cannot be asserted that it is a main cause. However, Israel’s status certainly has the indirect effect of undermining the moral argument against Iran to fully disclose its program to the IAEA. Iran is an NPT member and has not made any clear moves toward weaponization and claims its program is peaceful. Conversely, Israel refuses to sign the NPT and declare its program so Iran argues, rightfully, that the West applies a double standard with Israel.53
Non-Nuclear WMD Proliferation
These three cases demonstrate that proliferation begets proliferation sometimes. The multiple factors that affect a state’s behavior contribute to the threshold at which they will ultimately choose to pursue a nuclear capability.54 Egypt (and Syria) had a high threshold due to political, economic, and security constraints and so chose not to pursue. Iraq had a lower threshold and therefore pursued. One could make the case that Iranian proliferation is related to Israel’s program although there is little evidence to support this. However, Israel’s nuclear and conventional superiority has greatly contributed to the proliferation of chemical and (to a lesser extent) biological weapons in the Middle East.
Chemical and biological weapons provide Israel’s enemies with a cheaper and more accessible second-tier deterrent.55 Being a very small country with few geographical defenses and a largely concentrated, urban population, Israel is very susceptible to a chemical attack. Chemical weapons are not as destructive as nuclear weapons but they can still impose unacceptable levels of damage to Israel enough to ensure a form of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) in the Middle East. Although Syria has an extensive non-conventional arsenal to deter Israel, I will focus on Egypt and Iraq since they have historically posed the greater threat to Israel.
Egypt and Iraq are the only two nations to actually employ chemical weapons in combat since the end of the First World War. Egypt used them in the Yemeni Civil War and Iraq used them against Iran and against Iraqi Kurdish rebels. Egypt inherited a nascent chemical weapons program from the British when they departed in 1954.56 Its program developed with a lot of foreign help and soon developed highly advanced nerve and blood agents. Egypt became the largest proliferator of chemical and biological weapons in the Middle East in order to balance against Israel’s dominant nuclear and conventional forces. By 1973 it had supplied Syria with a non-conventional weapons program and supported Iraq’s program in the 1980’s. Egypt acquired missile technology from the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea, giving it a reliable delivery system for its chemical and biological weapons. Sadat stated in 1970 that Egypt had enough biological weapons to threaten crowded urban centers in the event of an Israeli nuclear attack.57 Egypt refuses to sign the Chemical Weapons Protocol until Israel joins the NPT.58
In the late 1970’s Saddam Hussein was terrified of an Israeli nuclear strike and lamented that Iraq did not have a nuclear weapon to deter Israel. In 1980 he stated to his defense minister, “Israel is waiting for the Arabs to attack them again so they can use a nuclear weapon. Their first target will be Baghdad and they will destroy us.”59 Saddam found his deterrent in chemical and biological weapons. In 1990 Hussein stated “we will make the fire eat half of Israel if it attacks Iraq.60 If we want to use chemicals, we will exterminate them.”61 This suggests a far more aggressive, confident attitude than in 1979. During the Persian Gulf War Saddam launched 39 conventional SCUD missiles at Tel Aviv. Although this was meant to draw Israel into the war in order to break up the Arab coalition, it showed that Hussein was confident that his chemical weapons would deter an Israeli nuclear response.
Effectiveness of Israel’s Nuclear Deterrent
The purpose of Israel’s nuclear arsenal was to secure it from a destructive Arab attack and force the neighboring Arab states to accept peace. The effectiveness of this deterrent shows mixed results. Israel’s policy of “nuclear opacity” undermines the logic of deterrence, which is based on the ability to signal to one’s enemies the capability to carry out unacceptable levels of damage. Israel’s nuclear arsenal failed to prevent a joint Egyptian-Syrian invasion in the Yom Kippur War of 1973, making Israel the only sitting nuclear power to be invaded (and nearly defeated) by non-nuclear powers. Sadat gambled that Israel would not use its nuclear arsenal since Egypt had limited war goals to regain territory it had lost in the 1967 war and was not planning a full-scale invasion of Israel.62 Perhaps if Israel declared its nuclear deterrent and made credible threats to use it Nasser would have thought twice about invading, or perhaps Sadat was relying on his chemical arsenal to deter an Israeli nuclear attack. However, the threat of nuclear weapons was effective in involving the United States. Israel was losing the war and, in a desperate attempt, signaled its intention to use nuclear weapons. This prompted the United States to provide Israel much needed military equipment through a large airlift which helped Israel secure victory. Henry Kissinger told Sadat that the reason for the airlift was that Israel was about to “go nuclear.”63 The United States feared that this war could lead to a nuclear showdown against the Soviet Union.
Saddam Hussein wanted to launch a large-scale final war with Israel in the late 1970s but feared the repercussions of nuclear weapons.64 It is unclear whether we can consider this a victory for Israel’s undeclared nuclear deterrent since we don’t know how dedicated Saddam actually was to carrying this out, especially with war with Iran on the horizon. Many Arab states have resorted to terrorism in the face of Israel’s military superiority. Nuclear weapons did not protect Israel from rocket attacks by Hezbollah in 2006, which led to Israel invading Lebanon, nor has it prevented Hamas from recently launching Iranian-funded rockets at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Terrorist organizations cannot be deterred because the deterring state cannot threaten anything they value. Israel’s nuclear policy has certainly not brought it peace.
The Nixon-Meir pact that led to the policy of opacity certainly had precedent during the Cold War when Israel was in a much weaker geopolitical position and was part of a larger game of deterring the Soviet Union. As Avner Cohen states, “This policy made strategic and political sense 40 years ago, but in today's regional and international climate, it has more vices than virtues.”65 Because opacity has lost its strategic value, Israel may be maintaining it for fear of the political repercussions of adopting a declaratory policy. Israel has maintained that it will not be the nation that introduces nuclear weapons to the Middle East.66 However, Pakistan and India also weaponized outside the NPT and neither country is regarded as a pariah. In fact, India is being considered for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.67 If fear of sparking an arms race in the Middle East is Israel’s concern this also is unfounded because follow-on proliferation has already happened and failed. There is no precedent that suggests that open declaration should cause Egypt or Iraq (who just signed the Additional Protocol) to attempt once again.
Conclusion: Getting through Opacity
There is no compelling evidence that Israel’s nuclear arsenal has directly increased its security nor brought peace. In fact, there is strong evidence that it has been a destabilizing force in the Middle East. Its program certainly did spark reactive proliferation in Iraq and Syria (to a lesser extent), and prompted Egypt to explore weaponization. Although difficult to prove, it can be argued that Israel’s nuclear arsenal is a contributing factor to Iranian proliferation. Israel’s nuclear deterrence did not prevent its near defeat in the Yom Kippur War, although Israel’s nuclear arsenal can be credited with compelling the United States to intervene on its behalf. The worst consequence of Israel’s nuclear arsenal is the massive proliferation of chemical and biological weapons in the Middle East to counter Israel’s military superiority.
Israel’s conventional and technical superiority, its peace with Egypt, and its alignment with the West, not its nuclear weapons, are the contributors to its tentative security and regional dominance.
Israel is the only nation in the entire Middle East that has not signed the NPT. Israel has also refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and has not signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.68 Israel’s refusal to join these treaties has severely undermined the nonproliferation regime. Iranian leaders view Israel as possessing the greatest nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons arsenal in the entire region.69 Although it remains uncertain whether this is a cause of Iranian proliferation, it certainly undermines the moral argument of the Western powers that Iran should comply with international law and the NPT. The prevailing view in the region is that Israel’s unacknowledged nuclear arsenal is the main driving force of proliferation.70
If Israel were to denuclearize it could lead to the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East, which Egypt and Iran have both openly supported. However, Israel is unlikely to denuclearize since its leaders still view the nuclear option as the ultimate deterrent against annihilation. Israel also doesn’t trust the United States enough to rely on its positive nuclear security guarantee. Shimon Peres asserted that Israel will not even discuss the prospect of dismantling its arsenal before peace is reached between all its enemies, including Iran.71 Paradoxically, Israel won’t denuclearize until there is peace, while the Arab States and Iran assert that there will be no peace until Israel denuclearizes.
Israel’s refusal to dismantle is understandable. It would be pointless and hypocritical to put the burden of “getting to zero” on Israel’s shoulders while the other eight nuclear weapons states maintain their arsenals. However, as long as the United States supports Israel’s undeclared nuclear status, Tel Aviv will have no incentive to compromise on this issue. As the war rhetoric toward Iran increases, the time has come for US policymakers to truly analyze and question the utility and legality of Israel’s undeclared nuclear program. Policymakers should press Israel to declare its nuclear status and sign the NPT to show the world that it is dedicated to peace, international law, and the nonproliferation regime. Such a move would deny Iran the moral high ground and increase pressure on Tehran to ratify the Additional Protocol. As Israel considers a strike on Iran, this should become a major issue of discussion and pressuring Israel toward transparency should become part of our overall strategy to dissuade Iran from weaponizing. Israeli denuclearization is the only way to ensure that the Middle East becomes and stays a nuclear weapon-free zone.
Endnotes
1 Gawdat Bahgat, “Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: Iran and Israel.” Contemporary Security Policy, 26 (2005), 116.
2 Ibid., 113 (original source: Maariv International, “Israel to Retain Ambiguous Nuclear Policy,” July 7, 2004)
3 Jeremy Salt, “Israel’s Nuclear Weapons: The White House Factor.” Middle East Policy 17, (2010)24.
4 Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Cornell University Press, 2010). 85.
5 Salt, 24.
6 Bahgat, “Nuclear Proliferation,” 116.
7 Kroenig, 106.
8 Gawdat Bahgat, Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East. University Press of Florida, 2007, 91.
9 Bahgat, “Nuclear Proliferation,”118 (original source: Seymour Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy, (New York: Random House, 1991) 179)
10 Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller, “Bringing Israel’s Bomb Out of the Basement.” Foreign Affairs 89 (2010), 31.
11 Ibid., 30-44.
12 Scott Sagan, “Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 21 (1996), 55.
13 David Gartenstein Ross and Joshua Goodman, “The Attack on Syria’s al- Kibar Nuclear Facility,” In Focus Quarterly 3, no.1 Spring 2009, http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/826/the-attack-on-syrias-al-kibar-nuclear- facility
14 Sverre Lodgaard, Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation: Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World? (New York: Routledge, 2001), 125-126.
15 Bahgat, Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 146.
16 “Text of Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s Speech,” The New York Times, October 30, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/30/weekinreview/30iran.html?ex=1161230 400&en=26f07fc5b7543417&ei=5070&_r=0
17 Maria Rost Rublee, NonProliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint (University of Georgia Press, 2009.) 109.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., 103.
20 “Country Profile: Egypt,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, August 2012. http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/egypt/nuclear/
21 Bahgat, Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 12.
22 Rublee, NonProliferation Norms, 111.
23 Ibid., 111.
24 Eugene Robinson, “In Gaza, Status Quo Won’t Do,” Washington Post, 19 November, 2012. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/eugene- robinson-in-gaza-status-quo-wont-so/2012/11/19/1d2bd684-3287-11e2-bfd5- e202b6d7b501_story.html
25 Bahgat, Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 54.
26 Hal Brands and David Palkki. “Saddam, Israel, and the Bomb: Nuclear Alarmism Justified?” International Security 36 (2011), 139.
27 Ibid., 142.
28 Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, “Revisiting Osirak: Preventive Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Risks,” International Security 36 (2011), 113.
29 Ibid., 131.
30 Ibid., 116.
31 Brands and Palkki, 158.
32 Ibid., 117.
33 Bahgat, Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 50.
34 Ibid., 54.
35 Ibid., 21.
36 Bahgat, Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 21.
37 “The Additional Protocol is a legal document granting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) complementary inspection authority to that provided in underlying safeguards agreements. The principal aim is to enable the IAEA inspectorate to provide assurance about both declared and possible undeclared activities. Under the Protocol, the IAEA is granted expanded rights of access to information and sites, as well as additional authority to use the most advanced technologies during the verification process.” Nuclear Threat Initiative: Glossary, http://www.nti.org/glossary/#
38 Paul K. Kerr, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations,” Congressional Research Service, September 18, 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R40094.pdf.
39 Ibid., 7.
40 “IAEA report confirms Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful: Soltanieh,” The Tehran Times, November 18, 2012, http://tehrantimes.com/politics/103414- iaea-report-confirms-irans-nuclear-program-is-peaceful-soltanieh
41 Kenneth Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs 91 (2012), 2-5.
42 Clifton Sherrill. “Why Iran wants the Bomb and What it Means for US Policy.” Nonproliferation Review 19 (2012), 43.
43 The Wisconsin Project on Arms Control, “Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan - The Father of the Islamic Bomb,”, http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/pakistan/khan.html
44 Sherrill, 41.
45 Waltz, 4.
46 Richard Cohen, “Iran, Nukes and the Drums of War,” New York Daily News, 1 October 2012. http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/iran-nukes- drums-war-article-1.1172297
47 Trisha Sertori, “Iran’s Ahmedinejad says anyone stockpiling atom bombs ‘retarded’.” Reuters, November 8, 2012. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/49745394/ns/world_news- mideast_n_africa/t/irans-ahmadinejad-says-anyone-stockpiling-atom-bombs- retarded/#.UKu0P-TAcgo
48 Bahgat, Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 28.
49 Bahgat, “Nuclear Proliferation,” 29.
50 Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb,” 4.
51 Sherrill, “Why Iran wants the Bomb,” 35.
52 Bahgat, Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 26, 31.
53 Ibid., 27.
54 Philipp C. Bleek, “Why do States Proliferate?” Chapter 8 in William Potter and Gaukjar Mukhatzhanova, eds. Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: Volume 1. The Role of Theory. (California: Stanford University Press, 2010), 186.
55 Bahgat, Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 157.
56 Ibid., 110.
57 Ibid., 111.
58 Nabil Fahmy, “Mindful of the Middle East: Egypt’s Reaction to the New US Nuclear Posture Review,” Nonproliferation Review 18 (2011), 166.
59 Brands and Palkki, 145.
60 Bahgat, Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 49.
61 Brands and Palkki, 160.
62 Rublee, 117.
63 Warner D. Farr “The Third Temple’s Holy of Holies: Israel’s Nuclear Weapons.” Counterproliferation Papers 2 (1999), http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/farr.htm
64 Brands and Palkki, 135.
65 Cohen and Miller.
66 Ibid.
67 Paul K. Kerr, “U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service, 26 June, 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33016.pdf
68 Bahgat, Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 161.
69 Bahgat, “Nuclear Proliferation” 29.
70 Abbas Kadhim, “The Future of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East,”
Nonproliferation Review 13 (2006), 1.
71 Bahgat, Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 107.