Between Russia and the EU: Three Choices Facing Kaliningrad

Abstract

The article considers the role of the Kaliningrad region in Russia-EU relations and the consequences of its being situated separately from the Russian Federation (RF), between Poland and Lithuania. The author makes three main arguments: that Kaliningrad must refrain from integrating into the EU faster than the rest of Russia, that a visa-free regime is needed for Kaliningrad citizens, and that the euro need not be used as a second currency in Kaliningrad.


Russia, the world’s largest state by land area, is a federation administratively divided into 83 constituencies, all of which are contiguous except for one region: the Kaliningrad oblast. It is separated from the rest of mainland Russia, sharing borders with Poland and Lithuania. This circumstance gives Kaliningrad a special place in Russian foreign policy, as well highlighting the potential for building relations between Russia and the European Union. Against this background, it is important to examine the role of Kaliningrad in EU-Russia bilateral relations. Moreover, the relevance of this issue is apparent in the current negotiations between Moscow and Brussels on the status of Kaliningrad: both sides have strong interests in a political status for Kaliningrad that provides the greatest benefit to them. This paper analyzes the current status of the Kaliningrad issue, introduces the EU and Russian opinions on its development, and presents original analysis on the possible and most favorable variants of this development.

The Kaliningrad oblast is the Westernmost and smallest region of Russia (but not the smallest constituency). With a territory of 15,100 square km and a population of approximately 1 million, the region is situated in central Europe and borders Poland in the south and Lithuania in the north and east, as well as the Baltic Sea.1 The geographic location of this region makes it strategically important in forming Russian foreign policy towards the EU. After the EU enlargement of 2004, Kaliningrad became an  enclave inside the union, making the settlement of its status even more pressing for EU-Russia relations than it had been previously. The EU recognized Russia’s concerns about a possible negative impact of the enlargement on the transit of people and goods between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia. This led to an agreement between the EU and Russia on November 11, 2002, on a people transit regime. This meant that Kaliningrad citizens could travel freely to Poland and Lithuania, while citizens of those two countries could enter the territory of Kaliningrad without any problems as well. A joint statement between the two on April 27, 2004, contained provisions to ensure efficient transit of goods.2

In 2006, a federal law of the Russian Federation came into force, in which Kaliningrad gained Special Economic Zone status, entailing favorable rules for payment of customs duties. This status led to the establishment of import goods assembly plants for the Russian market. Additionally, new rules introduced in 2006 gave tax incentives for large investments.

These measures mentioned provide an easier and freer movement of goods and attract more foreign investments to the region, and consequently provide economic development for Kaliningrad. However, economics is not the only issue that needs attention in the region. The problem of population movement is far more important, and often discussed.

Before the entry of Poland and Lithuania in the EU, visas were issued to Kaliningrad citizens with a simplified regime (i.e. free long-term, multiple entry). However, after the EU enlargement in 2004, Kaliningrad citizens lost these privileges.3 At the end of 2011, the Kaliningrad region, along with some constituencies of Poland, was attached to the frontier zone of the EU, ensuring that citizens of those territories could use the favorable visa regime while travelling to and from Europe. The European Commission confirmed that from 2012 onwards, a new visa regime would be applied to all the citizens of the Kaliningrad region, regardless of their location on the border. This change is a significant gesture towards the Russian population, as this regime was previously applied only to those who were located within 30 kms of the border zone.4

While some of the major challenges posed by Kaliningrad to EU Russia relations have been solved, many others have not. The EU claims that its objectives on Kaliningrad development are:5

 • To promote sustainable development of Kaliningrad as an integral part of both Russia and the Baltic Sea region.

• To help ensure efficient transit of persons and goods between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia and to solve practical problems that may arise as a result of the region’s enclave position in the EU.

• To help protect the environment in Kaliningrad and the Baltic Sea region.

• To make Kaliningrad a positive example of cooperation between the EU and Russia.

Regarding visas and the free movement of persons, the EU argues that “the integrity of the external borders and the security of the Union cannot be vouched for with arrangements emanating from Soviet and post-Soviet practices where passports and visas are replaced by identification documents and special permits.”6 However, as mentioned previously, the European Commission has already made concessions to Russia. With respect to the issues of crime and illegal immigration, the EU seeks increased cooperation between EU and Russian authorities and readmission agreements with Russia, and has offered technical and financial assistance. In general, the EU considers the Kaliningrad region as one of the primary areas of cooperation with Russia, as it is the closest geographically.7

Russia’s position was first outlined in the “Medium Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the EU (2000-2010),” which was presented at the EU-Russia summit in October 1999. This document put forward the idea of Kaliningrad as a “pilot region” for EU-Russia cooperation in the 21st century.8 It stipulated that Russian authorities implement judicial and economic reforms, as well as a program to fight corruption. Russian interest began to lag, however, when Vladimir Putin, elected President in 2000, adopted a less cooperative stance on Kaliningrad. In his speech at the 9th EU-Russia summit in  Moscow on the May 29, 2002, he stressed the need to reinvigorate the strategic partnership between the EU and Russia.9 He underlined the importance of Kaliningrad to Russia, saying the evolution of EU-Russia relations will depend on the solutions found on this issue.10 Russia is still worried about Kaliningrad’s isolation from the rest of the country; it once proposed establishing a corridor linking Kaliningrad to mainland Russia. From one expert’s point of view, “such a solution is unacceptable for the EU though.”11 However, the case of Kaliningrad seems to be more important for Russia than for the EU as this is a part of its territory. Nevertheless, both sides are interested in further negotiations. 

After considering all the issues mentioned above, it is possible to draw some general conclusions and answer key questions. First, should the Kaliningrad region integrate into the economic and monetary union of the EU? Based on the evidence, the answer is clearly no. The Kaliningrad region is a part of the Russian state. Although it is separated from the mainland and is an enclave inside the EU, it remains under Russian sovereignty. As Minister of Foreign affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov said, “Kaliningrad will have a union with the EU only when all of Russia will. And this is almost impossible.”12 Another issue is whether the region should have its own foreign policy toward the EU. The Kaliningrad region government is conducting a very active policy towards the EU in both the economic and cultural spheres, by having a huge executive apparatus and plenty of international economic programs to provide broad and effective cooperation with bordering countries and the EU in general.13 Moscow is also leading in Kaliningrad’s development, a positive gesture.

As has been said earlier, Kaliningrad citizens currently fall under a simplified visa regime. However, the official position of the Russian Federation is that the country is looking forward to a visa-free regime with the EU, preferably by the year 2014.14 Yet, the European side views it a bit differently. Its politicians propose not to rush this process,15 but would like to gain a temporary free-visa regime to Russia for the period of the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi in 2014.16 The work on this issue is already underway. The enactment of a free-visa regime for European citizens to the Russian Federation and vice versa would be a great step forward in EU-Russia relations, economically, culturally, and politically.

A final issue that will arise in future negotiations on the status of Kaliningrad is the parallel circulation of the ruble and the euro in the region. As the above discussion shows, parallel circulation would be ineffective. So far, the currency divide has not been a significant obstacle between the EU and Russia. Not even all EU member-states have adopted the euro; for instance, Sweden and Denmark retain their own currencies. The currency divide does not prevent the EU and Russia from sharing a common economic space and conducting effective trade relations. The examples of economic relations between the EU and the United States, the EU and China, and the EU and Switzerland show that there is no need for that action. Even non-euro countries remain some of the most significant economic partners for the European Union.

Thus, the introduction of parallel circulation or rubles and euros is not needed in Kaliningrad.


Endnotes

1 Vladimir Babkin, “Russia-EU Summit: Russians Want Visa-Free Regime,” 1 December 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/russianow/politics/8926408/Russia-EU- summit-visa-free.html

2 James Baxendale, Stephen Dewar, David Gowan, “Kaliningrad and the Impact of EU Enlargement.” (London: Federal Trust, 2000), 55.

3 CIA World Factbook. “Kaliningrad region. Russia,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html/ 

4 Evgeny Vinokurov, “Economic Prospects for Kaliningrad: Between EU

Enlargement and Russia’s Integration into the World Economy,” CEPS Working Documents,1 June 2004.

5 Jameston Foundation, “EU-Russia Summit in Moscow, Monitor 8, Issue 106, 15-23.

6 European Union External Action, “Kaliningrad,” eeas.europa.eu/russia/kaliningrad_en.htm.

7 Lames Baxendale , Stephen Dewar, and David Gowan, 55.

8 Stefan Ganzle, Guido Muntel, and Evgeny Vinokurov, Adapting to European Integration? Kaliningrad, Russia and the European Union. (Manchester University Press, 2008).

9 “Medium Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the EU (2000-2010),” October 1999.

10 Jameston Foundation, “EU-Russia Summit in Moscow,”Monitor 8, Issue 106, 15-23.

11 Саммит Россия-ЕС начался с критики Путина в адрес Евросоюза / (Russia-EU Summit Started with Putin’s Critique of the European Union), 29 May 2002, //http://lenta.ru/russia/2002/05/29/summit

12 Geoffroy Matagne and Simon Petermann, “The EU Enlargement and Russia: The Case of Kaliningrad.”Cahiers de Sciences politiques de l'ULg,(2009), 28

13 “Лавров: Отмена Виз для Калининграда Покажет Перспективы Безвизового Режима с ЕС,” (Lavrov: Visa-free Regime for Kaliningrad will Show the Prospects of Visa-free Regime with the EU), 13 December 2011, http://www.newkaliningrad.ru/news/politics/1414561-lavrov-otmena-viz-dlya-kaliningrada-pokazhet-perspektivy-bezvizovogo-rezhima-s-es.html

14 “Международные Связи Правительства Калининградской Области” (International Affairs of the Government of Kaliningrad Region), http://id.gov39.ru/index.php/ru/international-programms-projects.html

15 “Россия Готова Подписать Соглашение о Безвизовом Въезде с ЕС к 2014 году”(Russia is Ready to Sign Visa-free Agreement with the EU by 2014), 19 March 2012, //http://www.rg.ru/2012/03/19/bezvizoviy-rejim-anons.html

16 Vladimir Babkin, “Russia-EU Summit: Russians Want Visa-Free Regime,” 1 December 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/russianow/politics/8926408/Russia-EU- summit-visa-free.html

17 “Безвизовый Режим Может Быть Введён на Время Олимпиады-2014” (Visa-Free Regime can be Reached by the Time of the Olympics-2014), 20 March 2012, //http://www.ria.ru/society/20120320/600705301.html/

Varvara Malevskaya, Former Contributor

V. S. Malevskaya is a student at the St. Petersburg State University School of International Relations. She spent an academic year at Bologna University researching Russia-Italy relations, one of her main interests. Ms. Malevskaya is interested in issues of the image of Russian Federation in Europe, Russia-EU relations and how they are influenced by the Kaliningrad region on them. She an active participant of many scientific clubs at St. Petersburg University, and is one of the founders of the Study Angel Program, an international students’ assistance program.

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