Diverging Reform in Elite Communist Political Institutions: A Comparison of the Chinese Vietnamese Central Committees
Abstract
This paper examines the different paths to reform taken by Vietnam and China. Although on the surface level both countries have had similar paths to reform, and experienced rapid economic growth as a result, there are major differences in the power of the Central Committee in each country. Whereas policy in Vietnam is made primarily in the Central Committee, which is made up of 175 regular members and 25 alternate members, policy in China is decided on by the Politburo, and particularly by the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee. This paper examines why this state of affairs came about and what impact these differences have had on policy in each country, as well as the future prospects for intra-party democracy in China.
INTRODUCTION
As the 1980s came to a close, economic and political reform were advancing slowly but steadily in both Vietnam and China. Each country was recovering from the wounds of its recent past: Vietnam from decades of war for independence and unification; China from the Cultural Revolution, and both from years of economic mismanagement. At the start of the 1980s, the most dominant political institution in each country was the Politburo, with a group of powerful elders retaining influence beyond any formal post they may have held.
Yet, by the time the 1990s began, the role of the Central Committee in each country was drastically different. In Vietnam, it was the most powerful institution in the country, responsible for not only policymaking but also leadership selection. In China, the Politburo (and especially the Politburo Standing Committee) retained its role as the most powerful institution in the country. The purpose of this paper is to determine why China and Vietnam experienced such a strong divergence in the practice of inner-party democracy at the central committee level. More specifically, why did the Vietnamese Central Committee (VCC) become much more powerful than the Chinese Central Committee (CCC) when they were at such a similar level near the end of the 1980s?
In order to assess in what ways and why reform diverged in China and Vietnam, I first looked at two primary sources, the constitutions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), to determine the formal powers of the respective Central Committee in each country. I then reviewed the relevant literature to gain an accurate assessment of the actual powers and composition of the VCC and CCC. Following this, I attempted to explain the divergence between these two countries which, up to that point, had had a remarkably similar development. This paper establishes two main reasons for their divergent paths. The first is the major impact the Tiananmen Square incident had on the development of inner-party democratic reform particularly at the Central Committee level in China. The absence of such an event in Vietnam meant that inner-party democracy, which at times leads to leadership tension, was not viewed with the skepticism it faced in China. The second reason is the fact that by the end of the 1980s many of the elders in power in Vietnam had either passed away or retired, while in China they continued to wield an enormous amount of power.
I also examine one major effect this divergence has had in the economic sphere. Income inequality which has been a major topic of discussion in China since the Hu Jintao–Wen Jiabao administration took over in 2002 is much lower in Vietnam than in China, something that Abrami et al. believes is a direct result of this divergence in Central Committee power.1 Finally, I conclude with a look at whether the CCC will evolve in a similar fashion as has the VCC, and what consequences that may have. Among the consequences highlighted there is a significant chance that greater intra-party democracy will reduce inequality, but likely also lead to a more strained decision-making environment. Essentially, more stakeholders in the process should lead to greater representation of the Chinese population which as Abrami et al. found reduces inequality.
COMPARISON OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE POWER
On paper, the VCC seems only marginally more powerful than the CCC and the two share a great deal of similarities. According to the most recent CCP constitution, the CCC “has the power to make decisions on major policies of a nationwide character” (Article 15) and elects “the Political Bureau, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and the General Secretary….in plenary session” (Article 22).2 The proscribed duties of the VCC are similar, but where the CCC duties are vaguely worded as “major policies of a nationwide character,” the VCC duties are spelled out as “organize and [implement the] party’s political platform…determine the party’s domestic and foreign policies,” among others (Article 16).3 It is also interesting to note that whereas the CCC is required to meet at least once a year, the VCC is required to meet once every six months with the possibility of extraordinary sessions convened if necessary.
Another similarity between the two countries’ Central Committees is in the officials who have been appointed since reform began. The leadership in both countries “played to the provinces,” which meant filling their respective Central Committees with as many provincial and local officials, who are generally more reform-minded, as possible. This allowed leaders in both countries, Deng in China and Nguyen Van Linh in Vietnam, to overcome conservative opposition to their reform proposals. It is also noteworthy that provincial representation rose from a rather low level in Vietnam (15.6 percent in 1982), while in China it has remained steady at over 40 percent (see Table 1 and 2). This may be one reason, though certainly not the only one, that reform came about earlier in China.
The differences between the two countries’ central committees, while minor on paper, are much greater in practice. As Abrami et al. point out, in addition to convening on a more regular basis than the CCC, the VCC is also cited more frequently in party documents than is the CCC, an indication that the VCC is treated far more seriously than the CCC in their respective countries4 (see Appendix 1). In addition, though the CCC is responsible for selecting the Politburo, Politburo Standing Committee, and General Secretary, the Politburo also elects members to the CCC, a process that Susan Shirk has called “reciprocal accountability.”5 While the Politburo must be cognizant of the CCC’s feelings on policymaking issues, top-down authority is clearly superior to bottom-up authority.6 Thus, though it is by no means a rubber stamp, the CCC is subordinate to the Politburo when it comes to making decisions despite its formal powers.7 The VCC, on the other hand, has been willing and able to assert control over the Politburo, with one former prime minister summarizing the relationship as “one of a legislature and an executive that implements the [Central Committee]’s decisions (the Politburo), making clear to emphasize that the Politburo does not rank above the [Central Committee].”8
Though its effect on policymaking was remarkably similar to the CCC up until the economic crisis of the 1980s9, the VCC has since held the party leadership accountable on a continual basis10, even going so far as to reject the Politburo’s recommended candidate for General Secretary in 2001.11 Such an outcome is currently impossible to envision happening in China. On top of this decision, the replacement of leaders has also shown which institution reigns supreme in both countries. Whereas the VCC was reconvened in 1997 following the retirement of Do Muoi in order to determine his replacement, the decision in China to remove Hu Yaobang in 1987 and Zhao Ziyang in 1989 were made by the Politburo (and, in the case of Zhao, actually made by the party elders in conjunction with Deng).12
EXPLANATIONS FOR DIVERGING REFORM
Given the fact that a) the formal powers for the two central committees are roughly the same, b) provincial authorities became more important players, or were already important players in both countries during the 1980s, and c) Vietnam’s reform happened later than China’s reform, how did inner-party democracy (narrowly defined here as greater Central Committee power) expand dramatically in Vietnam and stagnate in China?
I believe two reasons stand out above all others: the Tiananmen incident in China (and lack of such an incident in Vietnam) and the deaths or retirement of powerful elders in Vietnam. In addition to these factors, I also explore two additional reasons which seem plausible but require further scholarly research to validate or deny. One is the fact that political culture under Ho Chi Minh and his successors was relatively more open than it was under Mao Zedong and his successors from the very beginning, making the end result less surprising. The other is that the Soviet Union which also had a system with greater inner-party democracy, had much better relations with Vietnam than it did with China, perhaps inadvertently influencing the evolution of Vietnam’s political system.
Tiananmen Square Incident
The Tiananmen Square incident, during which hundreds of democratic protesters were killed in Beijing, had wide-ranging effects on economic and political decision-making in China. Especially dangerous in the eyes of top leadership was the appearance of public splits amongst the leadership, which they believed encouraged further protest.13 During the Tiananmen crisis, there were two identifiable factions: “hardliners” led by Premier Li Peng and some of the elders who wanted to send the military in to crush the protesters, and the “softliners” led by General Secretary Zhao Ziyang who wanted to negotiate a solution with the students.14 Due to this leadership split, the government’s response was uncertain, first attempting to wait until the students left on their own then entering into limited negotiations.15 Ultimately, however, Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader in China, agreed with the hardliners and the military was sent in to clear out the square. Thus, inner-party democracy including a more powerful Central Committee became an easy target for those who saw any hint of political liberalization and democratization as a threat to stability.16 Instead, Chinese leaders (especially the powerful elders) ensured that true power over policymaking lay in the Politburo, particularly in the Politburo Standing Committee.
Jiang Zemin, the first post-Tiananmen leader of China (though Deng remained de facto leader behind the scenes), became head of a “fused troika” (General Secretary, President, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission) giving him a great deal of institutional power.17 In Vietnam, the “diffused troika” meant that the Premier, General Secretary, and President are all different individuals each competing with the other for influence within the Central Committee. By comparison, the “fused troika” in China meant leadership competition was for the most part concentrated in the Politburo rather than in the Central Committee. In addition, party unity was frequently stressed by leaders at the top; the experience of Tiananmen became a cudgel that conservatives would use against anyone proposing political reforms.18 Whereas economic reform began again in 1992 following a brief, post-Tiananmen retrenchment, 19 momentum for political reforms that had built up in the 1980s vanished.20 An examination of criticisms leveled by VCC members against the top leadership shows why the elders in China may have been afraid of the CCC playing a greater role. Lewis Stern writes of a “plenary session [in the VCC]…[beginning] with a strong indictment of the leadership of the topmost party apparatus and the Council of Ministers for the laggard pace of change in the country’s economy.”21 In the wake of Tiananmen, top CCP leaders obviously feared that strong indictments such as that would encourage more protests.
On the other hand, the absence of such an event in Vietnam meant the top leadership did not worry nearly as much about leadership splits. Though they reacted to the momentous events of 1989 including the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the Tiananmen Square incident, by making clear that the VCP would continue to remain supreme22 they had no need to diminish the powers of the VCC because they did not worry about inner-party democracy posing a threat to that rule. Despite severe economic problems at the beginning of reform, including high inflation and unemployment, VCP leaders faced a very weak internal opposition, an opposition which believed progress was being made regardless of the setbacks at the time.23 Essentially, students who came out en masse in Beijing were content to stay in their dorms in Hanoi.24 In contrast to what occurred in China, there was little attempt to consolidate power within the Vietnamese Politburo or pushback against the political reforms that had been instituted in the 1980s. Due in part to the factors explored previously, the Central Committee was, by the beginning of the 1990s, a more powerful institution than the Politburo in Vietnam.
The Elders
Another reason for the divergence of reform in China and Vietnam was the fact that party elders in China were still around at the end of the 1980s. These elders, men such as Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, and others from the founding generation of the communist party, held enormous power during the 1980s despite having little (if any) institutional role.25 As Bao Pu puts it, the elders were “dominant players…men who had been swept aside by Mao Zedong for reluctance to embrace radical programs [and] having been deprived of political clout by Mao for nearly two decades…anxious to seize power and use remaining years [to shape] post-Mao China.”26 Though Deng appears to have personally believed in the need for greater institutionalization, he and the elders were also more than willing to make policy by extra-institutional means. There is no greater example than the decision to declare martial law in 1989 which was not made by the Politburo or Central Committee, but rather by the elders at a small meeting convened by Deng.27 The subsequent decision to remove Zhao Ziyang as General Secretary was made in a similar fashion.28 While the elders were still in power, the CCC could not exert more control as the elders were able to consistently make policy and decisions outside of the formal institutional structure.
In contrast, Vietnam during the 1980s saw the death or retirement of a number of the original revolutionary generation. Between 1982 and 1991, the power and influence of the Politburo was greatly decreased by both resignations (six resignations in 1982, six in 1986, and seven in 1991) and the deaths of four Politburo members who had been important independence fighters.29 In addition, the new technocratic leadership that took over was both more reform-minded and less personally powerful than the preceding generation, meaning that institutionalization began to take hold and the VCC acquired a great deal more influence. In order to maintain power the top leaders of Vietnam were reliant on the support of VCC members, which those members were only willing to give in exchange for greater internal checks and balances.30
Other Potential Contributing Factors
There are two supplementary reasons that may have contributed to this divergence between China and Vietnam, but there is not a great deal of research to validate or deny these factors. One is the fact that political culture under Ho Chi Minh and his successors was a great deal more amenable to inner-party democracy than it was under Mao Zedong and his successors. As Anita Chan et al. point out, the VCP was always less ideological than the CCP, and this led to a more institutionalized method of transferring power from generation to generation.31 Whereas leadership succession in Mao and Deng’s China often ended badly for the chosen successor (see Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, Hua Guofeng, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang), Vietnam’s experience has been relatively tame and orderly. It is reasonable to believe that a more formalized and stable transition of power at the highest level in Vietnam had a positive impact on the eventual institutionalization of power at the lower levels, eventually leading to the current situation.
Another possibility is that the continued influence of the Soviet Union on Vietnam until its collapse in 1989 provided a positive example for allowing greater Central Committee power. The Soviet Central Committee was quite powerful, as demonstrated by its ability to remove Khrushchev as General Secretary in 1964.32 Although the Soviets had very little influence on China following the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s, they continued to provide a substantial amount of aid to Vietnam, and it is plausible (though difficult to prove) that Vietnam looked more favorably on the Soviet system than China did and was willing to learn from its example.
ANALYSIS
There is enough evidence from the literature to state that reform diverged as a result of both the Tiananmen Square incident, and the presence of the elders in China. To take it a step further, let’s imagine a China in which there was no Tiananmen Square incident and the elders have either passed away or retired (as they did in Vietnam). Would the CCC have acquired similar powers to the VCC? Although impossible to improve, it seems very likely. For example, reforms at the Twelfth Party Congress in 1982 and Thirteenth Party Congress in 1987 were aimed at democratizing delegate selection to the CCC.33 If these had been expanded upon, they would have inevitably put pressure on the Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee to also democratize their selection procedure because CCC delegates would feel more legitimate and demand more accountability.
In addition, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang acted in a very similar fashion to Nguyen Van Linh when they were attempting to implement reform, essentially taking advantage of greater provincial representation to push through additional liberalization, especially in the economic sphere. However, as Shirk writes, they “were apparently caught by surprise in 1987 and 1989 by the continued dominance of the elders.”34 Whereas Linh was able to hold on despite severe economic problems between 1986 and 1989, the elders in China were able to use their extra-institutional power to oust Hu and Zhao. Without this combination of factors, the Tiananmen Square incident and the presence of the elders, it is likely that Zhao (or Hu) would have been able to effectively do what Linh had done, which would have led to a more powerful CCC.
CONSEQUENCES OF DIVERGENCE
The consequences of this divergence have not only affected elites at the top levels of power, but also the broader population of both countries. As Abrami et al. indicate in their article, “Institutions and Inequality in Single-Party Regimes,” the different way in which reform has occurred in Vietnam and China has directly affected income inequality levels in the two countries.
According to their 2004 Gini coefficients1 (with 1 being perfect inequality and 0 being perfect equality), China has an index of 47.25 while Vietnam has an index of 37.08. Inequality has grown in each country annually, but the rate of change is far greater in China than it is in Vietnam (1.33 in China compared to .33 in Vietnam [see Appendix 2]). Beyond this, authors Abrami et al. illustrate China’s inequality level is greater than previously expected while Vietnam’s is lower (see Appendix 3). In the view of the authors, the fact that policy is directed by the Politburo in China versus the Central Committee in Vietnam is in many ways responsible for the variance in income inequality. For one thing, it means that there is a greater need to build a more diverse governing coalition in Vietnam.35 This leads to a larger distribution of rents within Vietnam, with much more in the way of public investment, especially as leadership selection approaches (see Appendix 4).36 Essentially, because a wider variety of interests must be accounted for during the decision-making process in Vietnam, the benefits of government largesse are more fairly distributed throughout the population. This has only increased in recent years as provincial leaders have become increasingly important in the leadership selection process, with the percentage of provincial officials on the Central Committee rising from 15 percent in 1982 to 41 percent currently (see Table 2). In addition, unlike in China, provincial leaders in Vietnam are also much more likely to actually be from the province they represent which makes them more likely to push for appropriations.37 This is in stark contrast to the situation that exists in China, where policy is made at the Politburo level. The Politburo represents a much narrower base, and political participation is extremely limited when it comes to their selection. Furthermore, the authors state that “the vetting role of higher- ups in the selection of a small group of candidates necessarily means that these individuals see their interests in terms of a narrow constituency from above rather than in terms of broad opinion from below.”38
The authors also indicate that the greater competitiveness of VCC elections compared to CCC elections allows for greater accountability. Whereas rejection rates in China are set by statute, rejection rates in Vietnam are determined solely by the amount of nominees.39 VCC delegates thus have a greater incentive to push for appropriations to the provinces they represent or risk losing their spot. According to the authors, this increased competition forces VCC delegates to “consider a wider swathe of society in their policy positions” which helps drive down income inequality (see Appendix 5). Furthermore, the greater role that the VCC plays in leadership selection, as compared to the CCC, means that leaders in the Vietnamese Politburo have to be more cognizant of societal needs. Essentially, there is more accountability at each level of the party to the level beneath them which leads to greater governing coalitions and less inequality as compared to China.
CONCLUSION
The reasons for diverging reform in China and Vietnam appear to be, for the most part, linked to one event and one non-event, namely the Tiananmen Square incident in China and the fact that party elders in China did not retire or pass away until the early 1990s. One consequence of these differences seems to be a greater amount of income inequality within China as compared to Vietnam. It is worth asking, what if China moves toward a Vietnamese-style system of greater Central Committee power and more inner-party democracy? It is an important question to address as China’s growing influence on the world stage suggests that such a change will have widespread ramifications.
Lower Income Inequality
A more powerful Central Committee, especially one modeled on the VCC (i.e., delegates that are more accountable to lower levels), would likely lead to lower inequality in China. As Abrami et al. note, VCC delegates must assemble a more diverse governing coalition, and are also more accountable, than their counterparts in the CCC. This leads to greater representation and, in turn, greater appropriation to a wider swath of the population. It seems reasonable to assume something similar could happen in China. Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao made frequent comments about reversing the widening income gap, and a more powerful Central Committee could be one step in accomplishing that. Li Keqiang, expected to take over as Premier in September, has also stated that deeper reforms to how income is distributed within China is necessary.40
Policymaking Becomes More Difficult
While reducing income inequality would be a major benefit of a more powerful CCC, it is clear from the Vietnamese example that actually making policy would become more difficult. As Abuza points out, starting in 1996 Vietnam has experienced the worst infighting and political deadlock out of any point since the VCP took over.41 In contrast to China, which was widely hailed for its quick and energetic response to the Asian Financial Crisis, Abuza notes that Vietnam’s response was “inadequate” and left a lot to be desired. It is also noteworthy that China has in recent years been better able to tame inflation than Vietnam.42 Policymaking during the reform period has been difficult enough; if leaders at the top became more accountable and reliant on lower-levels for support, would they be able to make unpopular but necessary decisions? One example that immediately comes to mind is any decision to allow the RMB to appreciate. It is widely understood that China will at some point need to allow the RMB to appreciate against the dollar in order to stimulate domestic consumption and stem a rising tide of protectionism from the United States. Yet, would a more accountable leadership be able to make this happen? Provincial leaders, especially those from the coastal areas that export more, would be unhappy and might be able to successfully challenge any leader who attempts appreciation in a way they are not able to currently.
Future Prospects
The future prospects for a more powerful Central Committee in China are strong although unlikely in the near future.43 As institutionalization continues to take hold, especially now that the elders are gone, and inner- party democracy continues to look more and more appealing for a growing number of party members, it is unlikely that the major locus of power will remain with the Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee forever.44 Already there appear to have been moves, though not official, to make the higher-level leadership more accountable to the Central Committee, most notably with the “straw poll” conducted in China in 2007. Though the results were never announced, it is claimed that Li Keqiang (Hu Jintao’s preferred choice for General Secretary) did quite poorly while Xi Jinping did quite well, which may partly explain why Xi is now the presumed successor.45 In the end, it may be greater competition for Central Committee seats that leads to the Central Committee acquiring more power. As elections to the CCC become more competitive, it is likely that those who are elected will call for the Politburo to face real elections and be held accountable just as the delegates are being held accountable.46For now, thanks to the divergence of reform at the end of the 1980s, China remains far behind Vietnam in terms of both inner-party democracy and power of the Central Committee. However, it is not unreasonable to imagine that one or two decades down the line China will have true inner- party democracy including multi-candidate elections for General Secretary, among other positions.
Greater inner-party democracy will undoubtedly have positive and negative effects for the CCP’s grip on power. On the one hand, it will likely lead to lower inequality as we have seen in Vietnam; on the other, it could lead to greater difficulty in the decision-making process and less efficient economic decisions being made. These trends will push in opposite directions on the CCP’s overall popularity and legitimacy with the Chinese public as a whole. There is a feeling that has emerged in the past decade that the deck is gradually being stacked with elites in Beijing and Shanghai, or those with connections to the party apparatus, emerging as the true winners of reform.47 Efforts to expand inner-party democracy, including greater authority for the Central Committee, would lead to greater representation in the decision-making process, and likely reduce inequality as seen in the Vietnam example. However, the trade-off will likely be slower economic growth as more stakeholders enter the decision- making process. China’s ability to respond adequately to economic crises will be slowed for similar reasons. These considerations may explain why political reforms have been stagnant for a number of years48; economic growth is simply more important than any gains that could accrue from modest political reforms. Whether the outlook for reform changes significantly following China’s 18th Party Congress this fall is anyone’s guess; we can be sure, however, that the Chinese leadership will pay close attention to Vietnam’s reform path for guidance.
Endnotes
1 Regina M. Abrami, Edmund J. Malesky, and Yu Zheng, "Institutions and Inequality in Single-Party Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Vietnam and China," Comparative Politics Forthcoming(February 2010). 3.
2 Chinese Communist Party, "Constitution of the Communist Party of China," (2007).
3 Communist Party of Vietnam, ""Statute of the Communist Party of Vietnam" adopted at the Eighth National Party Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam held in Hanoi from 28 June - 1 July," (1996).
4 Abrami, Malesky, and Zheng, "Institutions and Inequality in Single-Party Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Vietnam and China." 13-14.
5 Susan Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 84.
6 Cheng Li, "The Battle for China's Top Nine Leadership Posts," The Washington Quarterly 35, no. 1 (Winter 2012). 133.
7 Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China.84. See also Cheng Li, "From Selection to Election? Experiments in the Recruitment of Chinese Political Elites," China Leadership Monitor 26(Fall 2008), http://media.hoover.org/documents/CLM26CL.pdf.
8 Abrami, et al., “Institutions and Inequality,” 14.
9 Regina M. Abrami, Edmund J. Malesky, and Yu Zheng, "Vietnam Through Chinese Eyes: Divergent Accountability in Single-Party Regimes," (August 31, 2010), 13.
10 Carlyle A. Thayer, "Political Developments in Vietnam: From the Sixth to Seventh National Party Congress," Regime Change and Regime Maintenance in Asia and the Pacific no. 5 (1992), 2.
11 Zachary Abuza, "The Lessons of Le Kha Phieu: Changing Rules in Vietnamese Politics " Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, no. 1 (April 2002)., 10.
12 Abrami, Malesky, and Zheng, "Institutions and Inequality in Single-Party Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Vietnam and China.", 14.
13 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Testimony by Susan Shirk: Legacy of Tiananmen for Chinese Politics, June 4, 2009.http://www.cecc.gov/pages/hearings/2009/20090604/SusanShirk_statement.pdf, 1. 14 Andrew J. Nathan, "The Tiananmen Papers," Foreign Affairs 80, no. 1 (January / February 2001).
15 Ibid.
16 Sujian Guo, "Economic Transition in China and Vietnam: A Comparative Perspective,"
Asian Profile 32, no. 5 (October 2004)., 401.
17 Abrami, Malesky, and Zheng, "Vietnam Through Chinese Eyes: Divergent Accountability in Single-Party Regimes.", 17.
18 Minxin Pei, "Political Reform in China: Leadership Differences and Convergence," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace(April 21, 2008), http://carnegieendowment.org/2008/04/21/political-reform-in-china-leadership- differences-and-convergence/1bu.
19 Abrami, Malesky, and Zheng, "Vietnam Through Chinese Eyes: Divergent Accountability in Single-Party Regimes.”, 17.
20 Pei, "Political Reform in China: Leadership Differences and Convergence".
21 Lewis M. Stern, Renovating the Vietnamese Communist Party (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993)., 23.
22 Ian Jeffries, Vietnam: A Guide to Economic and Political Developments (London: Routledge, 2006)., 6.
23 William S. Turley and Mark Selden, eds., Reinventing Vietnamese Socialism (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993)., 5, 33.
24 Zachary Abuza, Renovating Politics in Contemporary Vietnam (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001)., 14.
25 The vast majority of them sat on the Central Advisory Commission, which was disbanded in 1992.
26 Bao Pu, Renee Chiang, and Adi Ignatius, eds., Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Zhao Ziyang (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009)., 275.
27 Sky Canaves, "The Insider Who Tried to Stop Tiananmen," Wall Street Journal(May 15, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124231172490719527.html.
28 Pu, Chiang, and Ignatius, Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Zhao Ziyang., 35.
29 Thayer, "Political Developments in Vietnam: From the Sixth to Seventh National Party Congress.", 2. see also Abrami, Malesky, and Zheng, "Institutions and Inequality in Single-Party Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Vietnam and China.", 10. The source of the article is needed. – (I’m a bit confused by this – I had previously cited in full both of these articles, so I don’t believe I need to do so again.) (LAH)
30 "Institutions and Inequality in Single-Party Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Vietnam and China.", 11.
31 Anita Chan, Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, and Jonathan Unger, Transforming Asian Socialism: China and Vietnam Compared (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999)., 9, 155. see also Barrett L. McCormick, "Political Change in China and Vietnam: Coping with the Consequences of Economic Reform," The China Journal 40, no. Special Issue: Transforming Asian Socialism. China and Vietnam Compared (July 1998)., 123.
32 Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China., 71.
33 Ibid., 79.
34 Ibid.
35 Abrami, Malesky, and Zheng, "Institutions and Inequality in Single-Party Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Vietnam and China.", 15.
36 Ibid., 19.
37 Ibid., 15.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., 17.
40 For example, see "Hu Jintao vows to "reverse growing income disparity"," People's Daily English(October 15, 2007), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90002/92169/92187/6283147.html. For example of Li’s comments, see Yamel Wang, "Vice premier stresses quality, fair distribution of affordable housing," Xinhua(November 18, 2011), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-11/28/c_131272987.htm.
41 Abuza, Renovating Politics in Contemporary Vietnam., 2
42 China’s inflation rate has hovered between 6 and 7 percent, while Vietnam’s is around 22 percent. See Michael Wines, "China Inflation Rises Less Than in Previous Month," New York Times(September 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/09/business/global/china-inflation-rises-less-than- expected.html. and "Vietnamese Economic Reform Faces Crisis," Ninemsn Finance(October 31, 2011), http://finance.ninemsn.com.au/newsbusiness/aap/8367679/vietnamese-economic-reform- faces-crisis.
43 Willy Lam, "China's Debate over Vietnam's Reforms," China Brief(May 9, 2007), http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=3966&tx_ttn ews[backPid]=196&no_cache=1.
44 Cheng Li, "Intra-Party Democracy in China: Should We Take It Seriously," China Leadership Monitor 30(2009)., 12.
45 Barbara Demick, "Xi Jinping on track to become China's next president," Los Angeles Times(October 19, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/19/world/la-fg-china-xi-
20101019.
46 Li, "From Selection to Election? Experiments in the Recruitment of Chinese Political Elites".
47 One measure of this is the yearly rise in “mass protests,” an admittedly flawed statistic but one that is clearly on the rise (no matter what the exact figures are.) See Barbara Demick, "Protests in China over local grievances surge, and get a hearing," Los Angeles Times (October 8, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/08/world/la-fg-china- protests-20111009.
48 Joseph Cheng, "China: little to no political reform," East Asia Forum(October 11, 2011), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/10/11/china-little-to-no-political-reform/.