China’s Diplomatic Dilemma amid the Russo-Ukrainian War

Introduction

Although Moscow and Beijing declared “no limit” to their strategic partnership prior to the Olympics, the Russo-Ukrainian War has put Beijing in a strategic dilemma. Beijing now faces a much more united West, the loss of Ukraine as defense partner, the war’s negative impact on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Russia’s violation of Beijing's long-held principle of upholding nation states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity. Thus, Washington should take advantage of Beijing’s dilemma by reestablishing a working relationship with China. 

China does not Stand to Benefit from the War

Since inauguration, President Biden has identified U.S. foreign policy as a struggle against authoritarianism - the Russo-Ukrainian War has given him just that. As late as 2019, French President Macro argued that NATO was “brain dead.” However, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, not only has NATO rediscovered its purpose, but Germany – the largest economy in the European Union – will also increase its defense budget by more than 50%. With enhanced policy cooperation between Washington and Brussels in the defense of democracy, Beijing will likely find it increasingly difficult to divide the West with its influences. On the other hand, China faces the real risk of being encircled and isolated by not just the U.S.-led alliances in Asia, but also NATO. U.S.-EU coordination on Russia could also lead to similar coordinated pressure on Beijing on issues like Taiwan, Xinjiang, and the South China Sea. Thus, rather than being a strategic opportunity for China, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has united the West and other U.S. allies to the detriment of China’s strategic environment. 

While the Russo-Ukrainian War exacerbated China’s strategic environment, one cannot overlook the negative effects of the War on Sino-Ukrainian defense cooperation. Moscow has been reluctant to sell key technological components due to fears of reverse engineering, intellectual property (IP) theft, and Beijing’s rising power. Ultimately, Moscow would not sell armament components to China that would enhance Beijing’s long-term self-reliance, which could in turn challenge Moscow’s interests. For example, Moscow had long complained about Beijing’s copying of Russian weapons, such as Beijing’s reverse-engineering of the Sukhoi-27 fighter with little regard for IP. Yet, due to Moscow’s refusal to transfer core technologies like aero engines, the Chinese Air Force remained dependent on Russian aero engines until the late 2010s. Also, during the 2020 Sino-Indian border clash, Moscow suspended arms deliveries to China for fears of antagonizing India, which Moscow has long perceived as a more important ally and arms market. 

On the other hand, the armaments components Kiev sold to China enhanced Beijing’s long-term self-reliance in critical areas. For example, Beijing acquired the Ukrainian UGT 25000 gas turbine engine with full technical documentation in the early 2000s. Because of this technology transfer, the Chinese shipbuilders developed the QC 280 gas turbine engines to power the Chinese Navy’s newest destroyers like the Type 052D and 055, which form the backbone of the Chinese fleet today. Thus, in contrast to arms sales from Russia, Ukraine’s technology transfers had the impact of allowing China to become self-reliant in naval propulsion systems. In fact, Beijing was on its way to acquire Ukrainian aircraft engine maker Motor Sich, but the deal was only scrapped after intervention by the Trump Administration. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Kyiv being a quasi-ally of Washington, the prospect of Beijing acquiring additional critical defense technologies from Ukraine has been diminished. 

As Beijing's ability to acquire core dual-use and military technologies from Ukraine diminishes, so do geo-economic opportunities. Ukraine accounted for 86% and 30% of China’s corn imports in 2019 and 2021 respectively. Disruption of this trade will likely increase hog price – thus, the price of Chinese families’ most common meat staple – in China. More importantly, the war will most likely disrupt the cargo trains (part of the BRI’s “Belt”) running between the EU, Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, and China. In 2016, the Sino-EU trains only made 1,900 trips, but that number reached 14,000 in 2021. The value of goods brought by these Silk Road trains increased from $8 billion to $74.9 billion during the same period. As maritime shipping becomes more expensive and time consuming amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the Silk Road trains offer an alternative for maintaining supply chain stability for China. Yet, with U.S. and EU coordinated sanctions on Russia and the ongoing war, these land alternatives will likely be disrupted. 

Finally, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has violated Beijing’s long-held principle of respecting nation states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity against foreign interference. This is because Beijing perceives U.S. safeguarding of Taiwan’s de facto independence and support for human rights in China as violation of China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Based on this logic, if Moscow could violate Ukraine’s territorial integrity in the name of protecting the human rights of “Russians,” Washington and its allies could do the same to China. In fact, Beijing has never recognized Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

Conclusion: A New Kissinger Moment? 

Although Washington and Beijing are engaged in a stiff competition, it is clear that both capitals share an interest in halting the largest land war in Europe since World War II. While Beijing considers Moscow a counterweight to Washington, since Beijing has little to gain but much to lose if the ongoing conflict in Ukraine continues to spiral out of control, now is the time for Washington to reestablish working relations with Beijing to drive a wedge between the two authoritarian states. 

Beijing has benefitted remarkably from the post-World War II international order since 1978, and the U.S.-China strategic competition arguably remains an intra-order competition because while Beijing seeks to gradually alter the order to its benefits, it is not seeking to destroy or replace it. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a clear violation of the UN Charter due to Moscow’s unprovoked attempt to conquer an independent sovereign state. For Washington, the goal must be to keep China within the current order instead of pushing Beijing further into Moscow’s realm of extra-order revisionism. This does not mean Washington should make concessions on Taiwan, human rights, and the South China Sea, but offering positive incentives (such as lifting of a number of Trump-era sanctions and investment restrictions currently placed on Chinese high-tech companies) to drive Beijing away from Moscow is worth considering. Ultimately, the U.S.-China strategic competition is akin to two football teams fiercely competing for the Super Bowl championship, but Putin’s Russia seeks to burn down the stadium and impose new rules to the detriment of all others.